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The Dutch example seems to indicate that too many policy reforms and drastic turns over short periods of 
time create havoc and are not necessarily going to bring the necessary renewal in the CSO community 
which many observers are hoping for. Change will first of all have to come from within (Huyse & De Bruyn 
2015: 20).  
  
Introduction 
In its 2015 State of Civil Society report, CIVICUS (2015: 143-) zooms in on NGO funding concluding, 
among other things, that in many countries the ‘funding position for civil society has worsened’. If this is 
true for Southern countries, it certainly is also true for many Northern ones – including the Netherlands. 
About a month after the release of the CIVICUS report, one of the leading Dutch newspapers opened 
with ‘Forse ontslagronde bij grootste hulporganisaties (Major layoff with biggest aid organisations)’ (De 
Volkskrant, 5-8-2015). Central in the newspaper article were the four so-called co-financing 
organisations (CFOs): ICCO, Hivos, Cordaid and Oxfam Novib. Overall, these four are seen as the major 
losers of the process of economising and restructuring the Dutch government NGO funding system. 
 
For the NGOs themselves (and a few others), the ‘news’ was already old before it hit the streets. Already 
in 2011, WRR (2011: 268) had called for a fundamental restructuring of the Dutch co-funding system for 
NGOs: ‘The point of departure for funding should be the situation and actors in developing countries 
rather than that of Western organizations’. For WRR this meant, among other things, an increase of 
direct funding to Southern NGOs and the need for Western (meaning mainly Dutch) NGOs to ‘profile 
their added value more emphatically if they wish to be eligible for funding’. Put differently: Dutch NGOs 
were called upon to professionalise and specialise.  
 
Four years later, the WRR call seems to have been well heard by politicians in The Hague. Although 
direct funding still remains a bit obscure (certainly in terms of policy) there has been a major overhaul of 
the funding system for Dutch NGOs. In fact, this overhaul started already at the end of the 1990s and 
since then every new minister for development cooperation has somehow changed the system, 
increased its complexity and hammered a new nail in the NGO-funding coffin. Is the restructuring of this 
system by the present Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation then just the next in 
line? Not really and for a large part because it indeed is accompanied by a major downsizing in terms of 
available funds for NGOs. To conclude from this that all NGOs have lost out is a bit premature, however. 
 
This reports first of all delves deeper into the financial consequences of the decade-long restructuring 
process of NGO funding in the Netherlands. It does so on the basis of a unique database compiled with 
assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The database covers a total of 47 subsidy schemes (open) 
for NGOs and 510 NGOs that between 2003 and 2015 received or were approved for funding under one 
or more of these schemes. As far as possible (see under methodology), this database includes data for 
the period 2016–2020. It allows for a more comprehensive and certainly more nuanced answer to the 
question of which NGOs really lost out financially and which actually benefitted.  
 
Although this money question may be important for many politicians and undoubtedly for many NGOs, 
one can wonder whether it is the most interesting one in terms of policy. Apart then from being able to 
pick out winners and losers and in the NGO funding game, the database allows for a better 
understanding of the reasoning behind the constant restructuring and thus the non-financial pros and 
cons of the changing landscape of Dutch NGO funding. More specifically, it sheds a light on two 
interrelated discussions in the entire government-NGO relationship debate. The first links up to the idea 
of Northern donors principally funding their ‘own’ or national NGOs and not international or Southern 
ones. Is this indeed the case in the Netherlands as well, and have there been any changes in this over 
the years?  
 
The second concerns the discussion of NGOs being seen by official donors as contractors or as ‘actors in 
their own right’ (OECD-DAC 2011). As such, it links up to the latest Civil Society Report of CIVICUS (2015) 
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which concludes, among other things, that many official donors perceive CSOs ‘as a pipeline and a 
contractor, rather than as something of value in its own right’. Does the data provide proof that points in 
one specific direction in this discussion for the Netherlands? 
 
Before addressing these questions, I first set out the methodology used for gathering the data that form 
the core of this report, and then provide a brief overview of the changing landscape of NGO funding in 
the Netherlands. This is followed by an overview of funding schemes from 2003 onwards and an 
assessment of the data available. I end with some concluding remarks and points for further discussion.  
 
Methodology 
In 2009, the first database on NGO funding was developed by CIDIN as part of its cooperation with the 
NGO Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (i.e., under the IS-academy on civil society). In 2015, 
CIDIN decided to update this database for the years following 2009. In combining its own extensive 
knowledge about the NGO sector in the Netherlands with a survey of government policies and 
programmes (e.g., using official documentation, the government website and discussions with staff 
members of the ministry), a total of 40 subsidy schemes were added to the existing 17 in the 2009 
database. Together these schemes cover the period 2003–2020.  
 
Tracking down which NGOs were granted how much in subsidies in which years from each of these 
subsidy schemes then turned out to be quite a challenge. For some of these schemes information was 
relatively easy to find (e.g., on the website of the ministry or in official documents such as annual reports 
or answers to parliamentary questions). In other cases, the ministry was requested to provide such data, 
which sometimes required them in turn to contact different departments within the ministry or external 
agencies responsible for managing specific schemes. Eventually, data on 47 of the 57 subsidy schemes 
was collected and checked with the ministry. For the remaining ten schemes data was, in a few cases, 
simply untraceable or, in most cases, not yet available as the assessment process for these schemes was 
still in process during the time of data collection (September 2015–April 2016).  
 
Together, data on these 47 subsidy schemes should provide for a comprehensive overview for 
determining the way in which government policy in the field of NGOs and civil society was translated 
into money. Still, there may be other subsidy schemes that have not been covered here. More 
important, a few warnings have to be issued beforehand about the data used here.  
 The database primarily includes data on centralised funding to NGOs (i.e., those subsidy schemes 
that are managed and administrated centrally in The Hague) for the period 2003–2020. Direct 
funding to NGOs – or decentralised NGO funding (i.e., from the delegated funds to the Dutch 
embassies in developing countries) – is only included for the years 2010–2015 and is treated 
separately here. Even if we assumed that we have covered all central subsidy schemes here, the 
analysis then does not provide the entire story on NGO funding from the development cooperation 
budget of the Dutch government. Naturally, the fact that no (reliable) data could be traced (yet) for 
ten known subsidy schemes adds to the fact that this is not the entire story. Here, it is important to 
note that the schemes that could not be included in our analysis are thematic schemes and that they 
would add only around 3% to the total subsidy amount over 2003–2020. 
 Several of the funding schemes are essentially successors to earlier ones. This is for instance the case 
with the MDG3 fund that was followed by FLOW-1, which again was followed by FLOW-2. All of these 
schemes have been included as separate schemes not only because administratively they are 
separate schemes and they differ in time period but also because they differ in terms of number of 
NGOs covered and the amount made available.  
 Important to note is that the database only covers government subsidy and thus does not include the 
funds from any other source (e.g., subsidies from other donors, from other Dutch government funds 
not part of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or from donations by the general public). 
The database thus does not show the total budget available to NGOs for implementing their 
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programmes. Only Box 7, where we take a closer look at the four CFOs, presents data on the total 
budget, as derived from the database made available by CBF (Central Bureau on Fundraising). 
 
Box 1. NGO funding in the Netherlands – players and funding streams 
 
The simplest (and also most common) way of NGO funding is straight down the middle of Figure 1.1. DGIS 
provides a subsidy to a Dutch NGO (NNGO) which in turn funds a Southern NGO (SNGO) and this SNGO uses the 
funds to implement its programme aimed at a specific ‘target group’ (be they poor people in the case of, for 
instance, service delivery activities, or politicians in the case of lobby and advocacy interventions). Naturally, in 
reality the system might be far more complex and involve more layers. Part of NGO funding goes not to NNGOs 
but to INGOs and SNGOs both of which in turn might either directly implement activities aimed at a specific target 
group or use these funds to support the programme of (another) SNGO. It is also possible for NNGOs, INGOs and 
SNGOs to fund each other with part of the funding received from the ministry.  
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic presentation of NGO funding 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DGIS also directs part of its funding via embassies; these RNEs (Royal Netherlands Embassies) then use part of this 
money to fund INGOs, NNGOs and SNGOs (see Box 8 on decentralised funding). DGIS is not always the principal 
monitoring (or even selection) agency, as part of the funds available for NGOs is outsourced to external agencies 
such as RVO (Netherlands Enterprise Agency) (see Box 3 for a brief discussion of this outsourcing). 
 
 For the larger part, the database is based on information about the allocations (grant awards) under 
the different schemes to individual NGOs. In a few cases, these allocations were not available but 
actual expenditures were. Although there is no guarantee that the funds committed to each NGO 
have indeed been disbursed we assume that they have been, and that allocations thus equal the 
actual disbursements to these NGOs. 
 The connection between individual NGOs and subsidy schemes forms the crux of the database. In 
many subsidy schemes this is not a problem as commitments are made to individual NGOs. In other 
cases, however, commitments are or have been made not to individual NGOs but to alliances. This is, 
for instance, the case with the major (in terms of money) subsidy schemes of MFS-2 and D&D but it 
also holds for several others. In the case of MFS-2 all main applicants (penvoerders) have been 
contacted and they provided the exact division of the subsidy among the partners in the alliance. In 
DGIS 
NNGO 
INGO 
RNE External 
SNGO 
SNGO 
‘Target group’ 
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the case of D&D this information was not yet available. Here, we looked at the division between the 
partners in an alliance in terms of either their total budget for 2014 or the subsidy amount they 
received in 2014 and took that division as point of departure for determining an approximate division 
of the D&D subsidy between the alliance partners. In all other cases where the actual division of the 
subsidy amount within the alliances is unknown (i.e., Key Population Fund, Wederopbouw, SRGR-2 
and FLOW-2), 60% of the total subsidy has been allotted to the principal or main applicant and the 
remaining 40% has been divided equally over all other alliance members. It is quite possible, or even 
likely, that the actual division is different. Considering the fact that these four funding schemes 
together account for only 4.4% of all subsidies over the period 2003–2020 this will have relatively 
little effect on the trends discussed here.  
 Overall, funds have been equally divided over the years that the programme runs. When more 
detailed information was available (e.g., a subsidy period from August 2014 up to July 2016), this 
more specific period has been used to calculate the funds per year.  
 A specific problem relates to the year 2011. The data reveals that this year shows a sudden and one-
time dip in allocations/expenditures. Most likely the data for 2011 is skewed and specific schemes 
are missing for that year. Figure 1 provides an overview of all 57 schemes that were tracked over the 
period 2003–2020. In some cases it seems unrealistic to expect specific schemes to have suddenly 
stopped at the end of 2010 and then start anew from 2012 or 2013 onwards. This holds, for instance, 
for PP-1, HA and MDG3. In these cases a dotted line suggests that these most likely continued during 
2011. However, no data has been found to back up this idea.  
 For all NGOs covered in the database it has been determined (via web search) whether their 
headquarters are located in the Netherlands, another Northern country or a developing country. This 
information is then used to distinguish between Dutch NGOs (NNGOs), international NGOs (INGOs) 
and Southern NGOs (SNGOs). 
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1. Changing policies – introducing NGO funding in the Netherlands 
Up to the late 1990s, government funding of NGOs in the Netherlands was dominated by one major 
subsidy scheme. This Co-financing Programme (MFP) started in 1965 and benefitted four large Dutch 
NGOs in the field of development cooperation (i.e., the so-called Co-financing Organisations, or CFOs: 
Oxfam Novib, ICCO, HIVOS and Cordaid). Less well known or acknowledged is that there were hundreds 
of other (mostly much smaller) NGOs (mainly Dutch but also international and occasionally Southern) 
that received funding from funds administered by specific desks or departments within the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague or by Dutch embassies in the South (see Box 2). These latter 
funding schemes were unstructured and without clear-cut criteria (let alone a policy), meaning as well 
that essentially nobody had a clear view of how many NGOs received how much under which specific 
scheme.  
 
Box 2. NGO funding 1998–2001 
 
An incomplete overview of funding private organisations by DSI/MY (2002) reveals that over the period 1998–
2001 no less than 345 NGOs were supported by at least eight different departments divided over some 15 
different themes (ranging from social development to human rights and from culture to gender). Total funding to 
NGOs over this period amounted to €1,913 million. The number of 345 NGOs includes several individual funding 
schemes (i.e., SNV, NCDO, PSO, VMP) as well as the MFP (Co-financing programme: Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO, Plan 
Netherlands and Oxfam Novib). The nine Dutch NGOs under these schemes together received €1,645 million over 
the four-year period. This amount includes the regular subsidy granted under the respective schemes and the 
funding these NGOs received outside of these schemes. The five co-financing organisations (i.e., Cordaid, Hivos, 
ICCO, Oxfam Novib and Plan Netherlands), for instance, received €1,288.5 million under the MFP subsidy scheme 
but managed to add another €9 million from different departments. The NCDO managed to receive another €13 
million on top of its regular subsidy of €36 million. In effect, a mere 14% (€268 million) was left for the remaining 
336 NGOs. The latter organisations thus received an average contribution from the ministry of €800.000 for the 
entire period. 
 
Source: Schulpen et al. 2009 
 
Although the latter can still be doubted even today, in 1999 then Minister for Development Cooperation 
Herfkens started opening up this black box of NGO funding by adding Plan Netherlands to the MFP. With 
this she effectively broke open the monopoly position of the four CFOs. Her successor Van Ardenne 
more fundamentally changed the NGO funding system. In 2003, in a new (and – as later turned out – 
last) phase of MFP not only the four CFOs and Plan Netherlands but also Terre des Hommes were 
funded. At the same time a new subsidy scheme (TMF – Thematic Co-financing) was introduced for 
smaller, more thematic development NGOs. With new guidelines and criteria, TMF already went some 
way in the sought-after streamlining of NGO funding. At the same time, this was only the start of setting 
up, abolishing and/or continuing of a plethora of NGO funding schemes. It is thus no exaggeration to 
state that ‘more changes have been introduced in the grant systems since 2000 than in the thirty-five 
years before’ (Schulpen & Hoebink 2014: 173). 
 
Some 50 funding schemes for NGOs have seen the light since the start of streamlining in the early 2000s, 
and we will delve deeper into them below. Figure 1 provides a first overview showing that every 
minister since the early 2000s set up new schemes and was at the same time confronted with schemes 
set up by her or his predecessor. Naturally, one can wonder about the relationship between the wish for 
streamlining (as expressed by successive ministers over the years – DGIS 2009) and the fact that in 
reality tens of different subsidy schemes were set up. Schulpen & Hoebink (2014: 192) suggest that this 
contradiction between policy and practice is due to the fact that ‘new schemes provide an opportunity 
to fund new priorities’ while simultaneously offering room to manoeuvre for ministers confronted with 
‘untouchable’ schemes set up by their predecessors. In addition, some of the schemes are the ‘direct 
outcome of [...] parliamentary resolution[s]’ such as the Daey Ouwens Fund for renewable energy and 
the Political and Parliamentary Cooperation schemes of 2007–2011 and 2012–2016 (PP-1 and PP-2). 
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 Figure 1. Overview of 58 NGO subsidy schemes (2003–2020) 
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Others would probably say that there actually is no contradiction as all the schemes met the subsidy 
regulations of the ministry of the early and mid-2000s and the standardised subsidy frame designed in 
2010.  
 
The subsidy regulations determine that the Minister can provide subsidies under different themes. 
Before 2006, the regulation (drafted under Minister Herfkens) covered seven themes (each including a 
large number of subthemes): sustainable economic development, HIV/AIDS and reproductive health, 
socio-cultural development, political development, peace and security, environment and water, and 
gender equality. In the latest regulations (drafted under Minister Ploumen), eight themes are 
distinguished – all with their own subthemes. All these are different from the ‘originals’ and range from 
human rights to emergency aid and from strategic partnership for lobbying and advocacy to public-
private partnerships. As such, the general subsidy regulations express the general development policy of 
the successive ministers and show under which ‘themes’ subsidy can be provided. The exact regulations 
and criteria are then worked out in each separate subsidy scheme (with the regulation itself only 
providing some very general criteria such as the rule that the applying NGO must also contribute 25%). 
 
The standardised subsidy frame or Standard Scheme goes one step further. It is not a subsidy scheme in 
the sense that organisations can draw on it but a framework providing standardised and uniform criteria 
on the basis of which subsidy tenders can be developed. In a letter to Parliament on 30 November 2010, 
then Undersecretary Knapen announced the Standard Scheme as aimed at providing a uniform 
framework for subsidies to NGOs alongside MFS, and as a framework providing flexibility for the ministry 
to react to changing circumstances and to its own policy priorities. The Standard Scheme allows for 
‘flexibility in reacting to worldwide developments where an (extra) effort in (new) policy priorities is 
possible’ (DGIS 2010a). The basic premise of the Standard Scheme then is the idea of competition 
between NGOs for subsidies on the basis of tendering in which the quality of the organisation and the 
proposal is decisive. The Standard Scheme is one of the most important means to streamline future 
subsidy calls (based on fixed criteria and a tender system) while creating flexibility for the ministry 
(Schulpen & Hoebink 2014: 193). Although the latter is, at least to some extent, true, the fact remains 
that the Dutch NGO funding scene creates the impression of fragmentation.  
 
Many of these schemes do not play a role in the public or political debate on NGO funding nor are they 
part of the occasional NGO policy papers of the Dutch ministry. In a 2013 letter to Parliament, Minister 
Ploumen elaborated on the future role of NGOs in light of ‘the new agenda of aid, trade and 
investments’ (DGIS 2013a). Under the heading ‘Funding civil society organizations – lessons learned’, the 
minister praises the adaptive nature of the Dutch ‘development sector’ to changing circumstances and 
explains that the Dutch government has also changed course by limiting the number of themes the 
Netherlands is working on, reducing the number of partner countries, emphasising private sector 
development and making funds available for public-private cooperation.  
 
This 2013 ‘policy’ is the latest in a rather short line (certainly in light of the fact that NGOs have been 
funded since the mid-1960s) of general policy papers dealing specifically with (funding) NGOs. 
Essentially this ‘line of papers’ starts with the vision document called ‘Civil society and structural poverty 
reduction’ of 2001. After that, each of the successive ministers has published a policy paper dealing 
specifically with NGOs. As a rule, large parts of these papers deal with changes in the funding system and 
as such should mainly be seen as NGO funding policies. Simultaneously, they elaborate upon the 
changing government vision on the role of NGOs (and civil society more broadly) in development.  
 
The vision document of 2001 (DGIS 2001) is the only of the post-2000 policy papers that does not share 
this emphasis on funding as it does not include reference to specific funding schemes. At the same time, 
it is the first ever real NGO policy paper of the Dutch government (despite the long history of 
government funding to NGOs). ‘As the outcome of a dialogue between the ministry and NGOs, this 
paper, entitled “Civil society and structural poverty reduction”, called for increased complementarity 
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between different channels of aid and for fighting poverty by facilitating (self-)organisation, combining 
strengths and organising countervailing power. Taking as a starting point the idea that CSOs are not the 
implementing arm of government policy, the paper still indicates that governments have a role to play 
by creating an enabling environment in which civil society can flourish. What is important is the idea that 
CSOs are autonomous organizations and that Southern CSOs can best be supported by their Northern 
civil society counterparts. This requires Northern CSOs to be autonomous, which means that the Dutch 
government should not impose its own policy upon them, even when it is funding their activities. Finally, 
the policy paper emphasized the need for core funding, as this was seen as befitting the autonomous 
role of CSOs’ (Schulpen & Hoebink 2014: 185). Of specific interest here is the last sentence of the 
document stipulating that ‘the government will, in cooperation with big development organisations, 
increase the entry for smaller development organisations and non-traditional actors to the subsidy 
system’ (DGIS 2001). Later papers return to this issue of opening up the subsidy scheme. 
 
In 2003, Minister Van Ardenne published her general policy paper (DGIS 2003). Under the banner of 
quality, the documents starts from the idea of ‘partnership’; calls for an integrated foreign policy, 
making coherence a central objective; sees a central role for the private commercial sector in 
development; reduces the number of partner countries of Dutch aid; and distinguishes priority themes. 
Less than one page of the 26-page document is dedicated to NGOs. After stating that NGOs are being 
funded under different programmes (with the TMF scheme being mentioned as a subsidy scheme that 
‘does justice to the role that NGOs play in development cooperation’), this one page is dedicated to 
announcing (1) the future merger of TMF and MFP (from 2007 onwards) while simultaneously abolishing 
the fixed percentage of 11% of the development budget for NGOs (as was then still the case for MFP) 
and (2) the drafting of a ‘clear vision on the role of civil society in development cooperation’ in 
consultation with NGOs. The fact that such a vision was finalised only two years earlier (see above) 
obviously was regarded as insufficient. Starting points for such a new vision were questions regarding 
partnership, coherence and (particularly) complementarity between the bilateral policy and the 
programmes of NGOs (e.g., by making clear working agreements between NGOs and Dutch embassies). 
It took another ten years before this idea of partnership between NGOs and the ministry/embassies 
became the norm in the major subsidy scheme for NGOs (see below under Minister Ploumen). 
 
It also took until 2008 before Van Ardenne’s call for a new broad consultation with NGOs materialised 
under her successor Koenders. Koenders is also the minister who wrote (and spoke) quite substantially 
about NGOs. This was not yet the case in his 2007 general policy paper ‘Our Common Concern’ (DGIS 
2007) but he made up for this in a few speeches around the broad consultation of 2008 and his policy 
memorandum on CSOs, entitled ‘Cooperation, customisation and added value’ (DGIS 2009). Starting 
points for Koenders were new development challenges and new actors calling for a ‘modernisation 
agenda’. At the outset, it was already clear that more was expected of NGOs (e.g., more quality, greater 
involvement of the general public, less fragmentation) but that this should be done with a reduced 
budget. NGOs were thus called upon to ‘do more with fewer resources’ (ibid.: 4). The grant programmes 
emerging under Koenders (principally MFS-2) included some additional objectives that clearly stem from 
the analysis in the policy paper: ‘the clearest of these additional objectives is the desire to use grants as 
an instrument to reduce fragmentation in the NGDO sector’ (Schulpen & Hoebink 2014: 187). Equally 
important is that in this modernisation agenda, NGOs were mainly seen as having a political role (e.g., 
contributing to democratisation by strengthening civil society, lobbying, advocacy) thus downplaying 
their service-delivery role. It would take up to 2012 before this political role of NGOs became truly 
central to the major NGO funding scheme. 
 
Whereas Koenders already had to downsize the budget (and NGOs complained that their budgets were 
cut disproportionally), budget cuts formed the starting point for his successor, Knapen (2010–2012). 
According to Knapen these cuts at the same time ‘created the opportunity to make sharp choices’ (DGIS 
2010b: 1). Central in this ‘fundamental restructuring’ of the Dutch development policy were the 
substantial reduction in partner countries of Dutch aid, a shift from social to economic development, a 
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move from ‘aid to investments’ and a reduction in the number of focus sectors. In effect, NGOs were 
about to lose substantial sums (including a proposed cut of 12.5% in the already agreed-upon budget for 
MFS-2 for the period 2011–2015 and budget cuts for SNV, VMP and PSO of in total €20 million). Knapen 
also announced a renewed discussion with NGOs about the ‘future of the subsidy system’. His own 
starting point for this discussion was the idea that ‘a large financial dependence from the government 
puts into perspective their position as representatives of a vital civil society’ (ibid.: 10). NGOs were thus 
called upon to strengthen their ties ‘with society’ meaning that they in future should rely more on funds 
from society than on those from the government. 
  
Continuing budget cuts were then brought together with the centrality of the political role of NGOs (as 
introduced by Koenders) by Minister Ploumen in 2013. With MFS-2 and a large number of thematic 
funding schemes coming to an end in 2015–2016, Ploumen set out to further restructure NGO funding. 
In her first general policy paper entitled ‘A World to gain – a new agenda for aid, trade and investment’ 
(DGIS 2013b) NGOs received scant attention. Still, the direction of Ploumen’s policy was quite clear. 
With civil society organisations growing ‘stronger in low- and middle-income countries’ there is a need 
to prevent Dutch NGOs from ‘competing with local organisations’. The central role of Northern NGOs 
(and at the same time the main objective of the Dutch NGO policy) then is to ‘strengthen their 
counterparts’ in the South either directly (i.e., through financial and technical support) or indirectly (i.e., 
by ‘connecting national and global agendas for direct poverty reduction, economic cooperation and 
international public goods’ and by ‘relieving the political pressure faced by [Southern NGOs]’). At the 
same time, the idea in the 2001 policy paper of governments having a role to play in creating an 
enabling environment in which civil society can flourish comes back as well in Ploumen’s NGO policy.  
 
These objectives already point to the need for a close partnership (not only between NGOs but also with 
the government giving weight to Van Ardenne’s ideas about complementarity) and to a much more 
political focus (in terms of ‘providing a counterweight to governments and businesses’) in the NGO 
policy. The latter then reflects the idea that the central role of NGOs is to hold ‘development co-
operation partners to account, pushing for action on national and global commitments and scrutiny to 
ensure productive and accountable investment of public resources’ (OECD-DAC 2015: 18). For CIVICUS 
(2015) the targeting of ‘ODA towards lobby and advocacy from 2016’ onwards allows for the funding of 
truly change-seeking CSOs and makes the Netherlands ‘a brave donor’. Ploumen’s NGO policy paper 
(DGIS 2013a) focuses on the main subsidy scheme MFS and on direct funding via embassies, and only 
briefly touches on some other existing individual subsidy schemes (SNV, NCDO and VMP). This also 
means that the thematic subsidy schemes were not discussed even though these are the schemes that 
change substantially over the years and mainly contribute to the growing fragmentation of Dutch NGO 
funding.  
 
The MFS-2 programme – ending in 2015 – was then essentially replaced by the D&D programme and 
Voice (then still called the Innovation Fund), while direct funding was brought together under the 
Accountability Fund. D&D primarily is a form of indirect funding (although Southern NGOs are eligible for 
funding). Voice is focused on ‘organisations from low- and low-middle-income countries’ but in fact is a 
mixed direct-indirect fund as ‘these organisations can be situated in both the South and in the 
Netherlands’ (DGIS 2015: 1). The Accountability Fund (Account.) is a form of direct funding (or 
decentralised NGO funding – see Box 7) but with the possibility that Dutch NGOs can also be involved by 
the Southern NGO. Importantly, all three focus on lobby and advocacy-type of activities (essentially 
banning service-delivery activities of NGOs from funding under these schemes) and that taken together 
they ‘only’ represent about €210 million in subsidies per year (whereas in the period 2011–2015 the 
MFS-2 programme on its own accounted for approximately €380 million annually). 
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2. NGO subsidy schemes 
Under 47 different centrally administered subsidy schemes (see Box 3), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has financed a total of 510 NGOs during 2003–2020 to the tune of nearly €10.7 billion. With at 
least ten schemes unknown (either because no accurate data could be found or because they are still 
being processed) this is in reality even higher. All schemes together draw a picture of increasing 
fragmentation of NGO funding since the early 2000s. In 2006, the decade-old MFP system merged with 
the only four years old TMF system into the so-called MFS (Co-financing system). MFS-1 ran from 2007 
to 2010 and was succeeded by MFS-2 (2011–2015) and then by the D&D (Dialogue & Dissent) 
partnership scheme for lobby and advocacy (2016–2020). Next to these central and biggest subsidy 
schemes, successive ministers since 2003 have started new (and much smaller) schemes meant 
exclusively or also for NGOs. Some of these schemes were only set up for one year, others lasted four 
years and were continued afterwards. The so-called SRGR fund (Sexual and Reproductive Health and 
Rights) of 2013–2015, for instance, was continued under the SRGR-2 Fund (2016–2020). However, under 
this SRGR theme other schemes were introduced as well such as the Opstapfonds (2012–2015), Child 
Marriage Fund (2014–2015), Key Population Fund (2011–2015), and the Choices and Opportunities Fund 
(2011–2014). 
 
Box 3. Centrally administered? 
 
The term ‘centrally administered’ should not be equated with ‘administered by DGIS’. In reality, some of the 
subsidy schemes included in this report are not ‘administered’ (in the sense of selection and/or monitoring) by the 
ministry itself but by outside agencies. These outside agencies principally come in three shapes: (1) other 
governmental agencies or ministries, (2) private for-profit entities (e.g., consultancy firms), and (3) private not-for-
profit agencies (e.g., NGOs and/or academic institutions. Outsourcing of selection, monitoring and/or reporting to 
entities outside the ministry is relatively rare. Exceptions to the rule that DGIS selects and monitors NGO schemes 
are the private-sector schemes also open to NGOs, which are administered by RVO (Netherlands Enterprise 
Agency); SBOS, where selection and monitoring was done by a consortium of Wilde Ganzen, PWC and Nederlands 
Jeugd Instituut; MFS-1, where selection was outsourced to an external committee; and Voice, which will be 
administered by Oxfam Novib and Hivos.  
 
There are (or have been) specific schemes for humanitarian aid, demining, crisis, human rights, 
migration, gender equality, global citizenship, political cooperation, energy and reconstruction. Some 
are meant exclusively for Dutch NGOs, others exclusively for international NGOs (e.g., SALIN – 2006–
2010) or Southern NGOs (Accountability Fund – 2016–2020). Some cover just one NGO (e.g., NCDO, 
VNG, SNV) while others include tens of them (e.g., SBOS, MDG3, FLOW). Some have a budget of just a 
few million (e.g., Daey Ouwens, Opstap), others have allocated more than €200 million (e.g., SRGR-2). 
Some are open to individual NGOs (e.g., MFS-1), others are either only or essentially meant for alliances 
(e.g., MFS-2). And whereas most were meant exclusively for NGOs, others were also open to NGOs. The 
latter mainly holds for the more recent schemes focusing on public-private partnerships such as the 
Fund Sustainable Water (FSW) and the Facility Sustainable Development and Food Security (FDOV). 
 
Below, we present some of the main characteristics of these schemes and the NGOs that have managed 
to tap into them. First we provide some overall data and changes over the years in terms of number of 
NGOs and amount of funding available to them. In the second part we look at such changes from the 
perspective of the different types of NGOs (i.e., Dutch, international and Southern), followed by an 
analysis using the starting from the subsidy schemes themselves. Here we make a distinction between 
major, minor (thematic) and individual schemes. In all cases, data for the period 2016–2020 is 
‘provisional’. 
 
Box 4. NGO funding and total Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
 
Twenty-five percent is some kind of magic percentage in Dutch NGO funding. It relates, for instance, to the idea 
that NGOs should fund 25% of their total budget from other sources than those of the Dutch government. 
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Essentially this is an old idea that is directly responsible for the term ‘medefinanciering’ (co-financing). However, it 
also relates to the idea that 25% of the Dutch ODA budget should be used for funding NGOs. Although it is a bit 
unclear where this idea exactly comes from, the latest budget discussions in Parliament led to a call from the 
Christian Democrats to indeed spend 25% of the budget on funding NGOs. Although the minister did not support 
a specific motion to this end, she did announce that she ‘strives to reach the 25%’.  
 
Figure 2.1 NGO funding as percentage of total ODA (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN, HGIS nota (several years) 
Notes: Centralised funding (blue and green) refers to the funds through the tens of funding schemes discussed in 
 this report. Decentralised funding data for the years 2010–2015 (red) are based on data provided by the 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs from its own internal administration, while those for 2003–2009 (yellow) are 
 estimates based on IOB 2014, Ruben et al. 2008, and the internal administration of the ministry. Data for 
 2016–2020 (yellow) are projections based on developments in decentralised funding up to 2015. Finally, 
 for the period 2016–2020 the yet-to-be-awarded funds under such schemes as Voice, ARC Fund and LEAD 
 have been added (purple).   
 
The question then immediately pops up of how realistic this ministerial promise is. Looking back over the period 
2003–2015, Table 2.1 shows that total NGO funding (that is: centralised plus decentralised funding) on average 
was 19.2% of total ODA with a peak of 23% in 2010 and a low of 16% in 2011. That means that even in the best 
year, the ministry was €95 million short of reaching the 25% mark. The period 2016–2020, however, shows a 
completely different picture. For the coming years, already-awarded grants under different schemes plus still-to-
be-awarded grants under centralised funding (also see Annex 1) plus a projection of funds through Dutch 
embassies to NGOs together are expected to reach 13% of ODA maximum. Put differently: for the coming years it 
is highly likely that the ministry will manage to add an extra €0.5 billion (or even more) annually to its NGO 
budget. The ‘striving’ promise of Ploumen then seems simply impossible to reach. 
 
Figure 2.2 NGO funding as percentage of ODA administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Note: Includes all expenditures from centralised and decentralised NGO funding. 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
5
 
2
0
1
6
 
2
0
1
7
 
2
0
1
8
 
2
0
1
9
 
2
0
2
0
 
Centralised funding Decentralised NGO funding 
Centralised funding (provisional) Centralised 'in the pipeline' (provisional) 
Decentralised funding (projection / provisional) 
0,0 
5,0 
10,0 
15,0 
20,0 
25,0 
30,0 
35,0 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
13 
 
 
This is different if we would only look at the ODA budget ‘administered’ by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (i.e., the 
Directorate General for International Cooperation DGIS).* Data from the internal administration of the ministry 
shows that between 2010–2015 more than 30% of the DGIS ODA budget went to NGOs (and this includes both 
centralised and decentralised funding) (see Table 2.2 below). From this perspective, it seems more realistic to 
expect the ministry to fulfil the 25% wish of Parliament. But even here, the fast-growing expenditure for asylum 
seekers (reaching nearly 25% of total ODA already in 2014 according to DAC data) might easily play havoc – 
certainly also because part of these asylum seekers funds are actually front-loaded from future ODA budgets.   
 
* DGIS (or, at present, the Ministry for International Trade and Development) is not the only government 
 agency/ministry responsible for ODA. Of the total amount of ODA in 2014 of €3.7 billion, 62.8% directly fell 
 under ‘International Trade & Development’ (MoFA 2013). The Minister of Foreign Affairs held 13.9% (for a large 
 part staff costs, but including also human rights, security and specific costs related to ‘an effective, efficient and 
 coherent performance of the European Union’. Smaller ODA amounts were administered by the Ministry of 
 Finance (2.1%, i.e., multilateral development banks), Education, Culture & Science (1.5%), Security and Justice 
 (0.2%), Economic Affairs (0.13%), and Infrastructure & Environment (0.0007%). Total ODA also included 
 specific costs for asylum seekers (6.3%), export credit insurance (4.0%) and contributions to the EU budget for 
 development (8.9%).  
 
2.1 Total funding and number of NGOs 
Overall, the period 2003–2020 can be divided into three phases (see Figure 2). The first covers the 
period 2003–2010 with total subsidies reaching a peak of nearly €900 million in 2009 and an average 
annual subsidy amount of over €770 million. The second runs from 2011 up to 2015 (the period of MFS-
2) with overall subsidies going down to around €600 million annually. The final period starts in 2016 and 
again sees a further drop in total subsidies. Taking into account the planned but not yet decided upon 
programmes, total annual NGO funding will be around €300–350 million in the coming years. 
 
As such, central funding to NGOs in the Netherlands has declined by more than 50% over a period of 
only a few years. Not surprisingly, the total number of NGOs being supported annually has declined as 
well although not to the same degree. Sticking to the same three phases determined above, Figure 3 
shows that between 2003 and 2010 each year on average 193 NGOs were supported. Between 2011 and 
2015 this was 175 (but most likely a bit higher because of data problems for the year 2011), and 
between 2016 and 2020 the available data shows an average annual number of 140 NGOs. 
 
Figure 2. Total subsidies to NGOs (2003–2020) – in € 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
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Figure 3. Total number of NGOs receiving a subsidy (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
In effect, the average contribution remains for a long time above €3 million annually per NGO (see 
Figure 4). For eight years between 2003 and 2015, this average amount stays relatively constant at 
around €3.5 million with only 2004, 2008 and 2009 reaching above €4 million (and 2003 – marking the 
start of the general overhaul of the NGO funding system – being an exception with a relatively high 
subsidy provided to a low number of NGOs). Only in 2015 it drops to €3.1 million. From 2016 onwards, 
the average contribution takes a dip to (less than) €2 million annually, then climbing slowly in 2019 and 
2020.  
 
Figure 4. Average subsidy amount per NGO (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
Data for the period 2016–2020 is, however, preliminary as there are several schemes that still await a 
decision on which NGOs will receive funding. The number of NGOs and the total amount made available 
will thus increase in the coming period. Nevertheless, considering the relatively small size of the yet-to-
be-allocated subsidies it seems safe to state that the period 2016–2020 will be substantially different 
compared to earlier periods. Although it certainly is not the first period witnessing a substantial decline 
in government funding to NGOs, it seems to become the first where the total number of NGOs 
supported and (thus) the average subsidy figures per NGO show a substantial decline as well.  
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2.2 Types of NGOs 
Naturally, NGOs are not equal. Here, three differences between NGOs are highlighted: (1) origin (how do 
NGOs compare in terms of where their headquarters are situated?), (2) size (how do NGOs compare in 
terms of funding received?) and (3) duration (how do NGOs compare in terms of the number of years 
they receive funding from the Dutch government?).  
 
Origin 
Origin played some role in the history of Dutch NGO policy (e.g., non-Dutch NGOs being excluded from 
TMF-3 and TMF-4 – also see Schulpen & Hoebink 2014: 188–189) and is generally regarded as a major 
challenge as donors tend to privilege their ‘own’ NGOs above those originating from other countries 
(and certainly those from developing countries). Data on NGO funding for the period 2003–2020 shows 
that the Netherlands is no exception to this rule (see Box 5) although over the years there have been 
some (minor) changes. A distinction is made here between Dutch or national NGOs (NNGOs), 
international NGOs (INGOs) stemming from other countries in the North, and NGOs from developing 
countries (SNGOs) on the basis of where the headquarters of the concerned NGO are located.  
 
Box 5. Preference for ‘own’ NGOs – DAC data 
 
DAC data are seen as notoriously unreliable regarding data on CSO or NGO funding. Still, such data allows for 
comparisons between donor countries, for instance in terms of their preference for their own NGOs. More 
than 80% of NGO funding in Austria went to donor-country-based NGOs in 2011, while Korea even reaches 
above 90%. With most DAC donors providing more than 60% of their NGO funding to these donor-country 
NGOs this is below 50% only for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Japan (OECD 2011; OECD 2013). Here, the 
Netherlands is comparable to Ireland with (in 2011) around 70% of all NGO funding going to donor-country-
based NGOs, international NGOs and developing-country-based NGOs sharing the remaining 30% almost 
equally.  
 
Note that the donor-country-based NGOs in the DAC system are not necessarily NGOs that are based and 
operate in the donor country. They may as well be based and operate in Germany or Belgium (i.e., ‘another 
developed (non-ODA eligible) country’). As such, the difference between donor-country-based NGOs and 
international NGOs distinguished in the DAC reporting system is different from the distinction between Dutch 
NGOs and international NGOs used here.  
 
Figure 5. Division of subsidy amount per type of NGO (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
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Figure 5 then shows that NNGOs are by far the most prevalent type receiving government funding – 
certainly when looking at their share of funding. Over the entire period 2003–2020, Dutch NGOs 
received 87.8% of all subsidies, with 11.2% going to INGOs and 1.1% to SNGOs. Still, and despite the fact 
that it concerns relatively small amounts and percentages that tend to fluctuate, INGOs and SNGOs have 
become (somewhat) more important over the years. This is most clear from 2016 onwards – although 
there are still some open schemes in this period. 
 
This relative prominence of SNGOs and INGOs is more clearly seen when looking at the number of NGOs 
supported. Figure 6 shows that Dutch NGOs make up between 48% (2005) and 85% (2011) of all NGOs 
that receive funding in any given year. Most likely, the percentage of NNGOs will decline in the coming 
years once all funds under the different schemes for the period 2016-2020 have been allocated. On 
average, in each year nearly 43% of all NGOs receiving funding from the Dutch government is of non-
Dutch origin. It is in this category that the main change has taken place with (from 2009 onwards): a 
growing – albeit somewhat fluctuating – number of funded Southern NGOs. It should be stressed that 
this is an importance in terms of number of NGOs and not in terms of money. Even in the best of years 
(2009 and 2010) SNGOs receive only €16.5 million or a meagre 1.8% of the total subsidies granted. In 
terms of percentage, they will do better in 2016 and 2017 (reaching at least 3.6%) but that will be from a 
substantially reduced budget. 
 
Figure 6. Number of NGOs receiving a subsidy, per type of NGO (2003–2020), in % total 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
Overall, from 2003 to 2020 a total number of 510 NGOs have received or will receive funding (see Box 
6). Just over half of them are of Dutch origin (257, 50.4%), while 187 (36.7%) can be classified as INGOs 
and the remaining 66 (12.9%) as SNGOs. These Dutch NGOs not only receive the most funds in total but 
also on average per organisation. As expected, the difference between NNGOs and INGOs in terms of 
average subsidy amount will be reduced substantially from 2016 onwards. This is, however, not so much 
because each INGO suddenly will receive substantially more but mainly because the average amount per 
Dutch NGO will decrease substantially. In 2009, each Dutch NGO received on average more than €6.4 
million, whereas this will be down to €5.2 million in 2015 and will be further reduced to around €3 
million in the coming years. The average contribution from centrally administered subsidy schemes to 
SNGOs was only 3.9% of that for NNGOs in 2015 and has never reached more than 13% (in 2010) (see 
Figure 7). 
 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
2
0
1
5
 
2
0
1
6
 
2
0
1
7
 
2
0
1
8
 
2
0
1
9
 
2
0
2
0
 
Southern NGOs (provisional) 
International NGOs (provisional) 
Dutch NGOs (provisional) 
Southern NGOs 
International NGOs 
Dutch NGOs 
17 
 
Figure 7. Average subsidy amount per NGO, per type of NGO (2003–2020) 
  
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
Box 6. Acceptance and rejection 
 
That 510 NGOs are or have been supported under the 47 subsidy schemes discussed here does not mean that 
these 510 were the only organisations that applied for funding. Ever since the reshuffling of the funding system 
starting at the end of the 1990s, subsidy schemes generally use a system where NGOs have to apply for funding, 
where they have to compete with other organisations and where they thus can be rejected. Even under the last 
MFP, the six eligible organisations had to apply and although none of them was rejected it marked a fundamental 
change from a system where government funding for the major NGOs was effectively renewed every four years 
without the then four CFOs having to compete with anyone else. TMF was the first more structured and open 
application process set up by the ministry and every funding scheme since then has been set up in about the same 
manner. The only ‘half-exception’ perhaps is SALIN. This scheme was not only meant exclusively for International 
NGOs but the INGOs that eventually put in a proposal were actually preselected by the ministry and none of them 
was rejected in the end. This application-by-invitation is perhaps applicable as well to a few others (principally the 
individual schemes) but in general the ministry uses some kind of tendering system. 
 
Table 5.1 Approval of applications – some examples  
 
Scheme  Applications* Approved  Scheme Applications* Approved 
 # # In %   # # In % 
MFP 6 6 100%  SRGR-1 76 11 14% 
SALIN 20 20 100%  Opstap 2 1 50% 
MFS-2 43  20  47%  CMF 7 4 57% 
SBOS** 101 59 58%  D&D 65 25 38% 
PDP-2 13 7 54%  LEAD 18 4 22% 
COF 27 4 15%  SRGR-2 12 7 58% 
KPF 1 1 100%  FLOW-2 264 9 3% 
FLOW-1 177 30 17%  TOTAL 832 208 25% 
 
* Refers to either individual NGOs or alliances 
** Only for the first round. Unknown how many proposals were put forward in rounds 2 and 3.  
 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of applicants for selection of the 47 subsidy schemes under investigation here, and 
shows that the number of applicants (whether individual NGOs or alliances) in most cases far outweighs the 
number of approvals. Overall, applicants have a one-in-four chance of being rewarded with a government subsidy. 
In some cases, the outcome of the selection process was contested with applying NGOs. Over the years several of 
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them thus opted to formally object to the decision made (either because they were rejected on the basis of the 
threshold criteria or because the amount asked for was unilaterally cut) and some of them even brought their 
case to court. Objections are only rarely honoured. Interestingly, a large number of applications did not pass the 
threshold criteria (meaning as well that their proposal was not even considered). Of the 177 applications for 
FLOW-1, for instance, 61 (34%) were rejected on the basis of threshold criteria, and this was even 60% for FLOW-
2.  
 
In other cases, there was more general critique of the selection process (see, for instance, Ruben & Schulpen 2009 
for a critique of MFS-1). The latest of these concerns the FLOW-2 assessment for the period 2016–2020. With 265 
applications of which only nine were accepted (all from NNGOs and INGOs), the ministry received some strong 
critique (principally for ‘excluding’ SNGOs from funding whereas they were important recipients in FLOW-1). 
Following this critique and parliamentary questions asked by the opposition party Green Left, the minister felt 
obliged to officially respond, stating that gender remains a central element in Dutch development policy, that the 
large number of applications ‘confirms the worldwide deficit in funding for gender equality’, that the ministry 
unfortunately is not in a position to fund all proposals put forward, and that an additional €5 million annually will 
be set aside within the Accountability Fund (period 2016–2020) to fund ‘feminist organisations in the South’ (DGIS 
2016).  
 
In her critique of the procedure and outcome of the FLOW-II tender, Brand (2015) also raises the important (and 
often forgotten) point of the costs in applying for funding without any security that these investments will lead to 
the desired funding. Although her own quick-and-dirty calculation that the 265 proposals put forward for FLOW-2 
had cost the applying organisations between €12 to €20 million is unverifiable, it is clear that applying for funding 
costs money and that when proposals are not funded this investment is money lost.  
 
Size 
The above discussion shows that the average annual subsidy per NGO has declined substantially in the 
last few years. Although this may be true (and hold for the majority of NGOs supported), there is quite 
some variance among NGOs. In fact, the average subsidy is extremely misleading as in reality the 
subsidies provided by the Dutch government to individual NGOs range between less than €1.000 to 
more than €131 million per year.  
 
Table 1. Average and real subsidies (2003–2020) (in € ‘000) 
 
 Total # NGOs 
receiving subsidy 
Total subsidy  
 
Average subsidy 
per NGO  
Lowest subsidy 
 
Highest subsidy 
 
2003 77 608.909 7.908 65 110.000 
2004 136 642.256 4.722 50 110.000 
2005 198 700.061 3.536 46 110.000 
2006 234 772.989 3.303 10 110.000 
2007 226 857.751 3.795 10 131.250 
2008 200 846.332 4.232 1 131.250 
2009 218 897.827 4.118 1 131.250 
2010 256 884.719 3.456 1 131.250 
2011 149 534.285 3.586 1 74.719 
2012 158 584.728 3.701 1 79.734 
2013 182 634.004 3.483 5 79.734 
2014 186 642.477 3.454 7 79.734 
2015 198 614.568 3.104 7 79.734 
2016 165 327.925 1.987 7 15.931 
2017 152 294.697 1.939 6 15.931 
2018 141 285.268 2.023 6 15.931 
2019 127 284.060 2.237 6 15.931 
2020 117 274.871 2.349 1 15.831 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
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The smallest NGO recipient is the Swiss-Sierra Leone Development Foundation (SSLDF), which received a 
total of €4.788 over a period of four years (see Table 2). This INGO is joined by two SNGOs and 12 
NNGOs to form the bottom 15 recipients of Dutch NGO funding over 2003–2020. Together these 15 
account for 0,005% of all funding over that period. It should be kept in mind that it takes another 196 
NGOs to reach 1% of total funding. The top 15 NGO recipients (all Dutch NGOs) take in more than 67% of 
all funding made available over 2003–2020, and even here numbers 13, 14 and 15 each only add less 
than 1%. Dutch NGO funding is thus not only highly geared towards Dutch NGOs but also to only a few 
happy ones while providing small amounts to a very large number of NGOs.  
 
Table 2. The 15 largest and 15 smallest NGO recipients of Dutch NGO funding (2003–2020) – in type of 
 NGO, total subsidy, # of years receiving funding and # of schemes tapped into 
 
 Name Type  Total Cumulative  Years  Schemes  
1 Oxfam Novib NNGO 1.323.443.244 12,4% 18 10 
2 Cordaid NNGO 1.306.972.844 24,6% 18 9 
3 ICCO NNGO 1.294.242.056 36,7% 18 9 
4 SNV NNGO 1.006.532.541 46,2% 18 4 
5 Hivos  NNGO 819.326.646 53,8% 18 9 
6 NCDO  NNGO 284.900.000 56,5% 15 2 
7 PSO NNGO 221.085.863 58,6% 8 2 
8 Plan Nederland  NNGO 190.952.223 60,3% 15 7 
9 FNV Mondiaal  NNGO 146.006.353 61,7% 18 3 
10 Rutgers WPF NNGO 126.950.109 62,9% 16 8 
11 IUCN  NNGO 110.823.174 63,9% 18 5 
12 PAX NNGO 100.180.315 64,9% 18 8 
13 NIMD NNGO 96.772.185 65,8% 17 6 
14 Terre des Hommes Nederland  NNGO 90.752.561 66,6% 18 5 
15 Aids Fonds NNGO 88.955.058 67,5% 14 5 
       
16-495   3.479.838.505 99,9%   
       
496 Nederlands Migratie Instituut  NNGO 51.053 99,9% 3 1 
497 Intent NNGO 50.000 99,9% 3 1 
498 Nieuwkomers & Vluchtelingenwerk  NNGO 50.000 99,9% 3 1 
499 Rabobank Foundation NNGO 46.400 99,9% 8 1 
500 Stichting Waterhelp NNGO 46.400 99,9% 8 1 
501 Arthavida Foundation SNGO 46.400 99,9% 8 1 
502 African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) NNGO 39.135 99,9% 3 1 
503 Venik NNGO 36.364 99,9% 5 1 
504 Basanene Dealershipo & Dev. Association  SNGO 36.364 99,9% 5 1 
505 Kontakt der Kontinenten  NNGO 30.000 99,9% 3 1 
506 Stichting VJ Movement Foundation NNGO 21.000 99,9% 2 1 
507 Development Support Front NNGO 17.281 99,9% 2 1 
508 Stichting Avanco  NNGO 15.609 99,9% 2 1 
509 Mwanawaleza Foundation NNGO 8.134 99,9% 5 1 
510 Swiss Development Organisation (SSLDF) INGO 4.788 100.0% 5 1 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
Not surprisingly, the happiest of these Dutch NGOs are ICCO (top receiver during 2003–2010), SNV 
(2011), Cordaid (2013–2015), and Oxfam Novib (2012 and 2016–2020). Directly below these top 
receivers are the remaining CFOs – at least between 2003 and 2015. In 2016, Aids Fonds suddenly joins 
the top 5 (with Rutgers Nisso Group following in 2017) where it will remain up to 2020 (not paying 
attention to those subsidies that still have to be granted for that period). The latter already shows that 
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the front position of the traditional four NGO recipients of Dutch government funds has finally been 
broken open from 2016 onwards, although they remain major recipients. The changing position of ICCO 
illustrates this. From a first position up to 2010 it goes down to the 16th position in 2016.  
 
ICCO is also a perfect example of a ‘faller’ in terms of government funding. Between 2003 and 2010, it 
still received on average over €120 million per year from the Dutch government. Between 2011 and 
2015, this went down to some €61 million and between 2016 and 2020 it will see a further decrease to 
around €6 million. Put differently, ICCO saw its contribution from the Dutch government come down by 
49% and 90% respectively. Besides, ICCO now needs more separate funding schemes to reach that much 
lower amount. A similar story can be told for most of the top receivers. But still, not all NGOs are a 
financial victim of the changing policy and (particularly) the decreasing budget allocations to NGOs.  
 
Overall, NGOs can receive a subsidy in all three periods, in two periods (not necessarily consecutive 
ones), or only in one period distinguished here (see Figure 8). Of the 510 NGOs, 262 (51.4%) only 
received funding in one period. The largest part of these – 209 NGOs – only received funding in period 1 
(2003–2010), 31 NGOs only in period 2 (2011–2015), and the remaining 22 NGOs only in period 3 (2016–
2020). Naturally, all of the 2003–2010 or 2011–2015 NGOs lose out as they are no longer subsidised at 
all in the next period. 
 
It becomes more interesting when looking at the 175 NGOs (34.3%) that receive funding during two 
periods. In most cases this is in two consecutive periods (i.e., 105 in period 1 and 2; 63 in period 2 and 
3). That leaves seven NGOs that skip one period – they thus received funding between 2003 and 2010 
and again between 2016 and 2020. Of the 105 who were funded during 2003–2010 and during 2011–
2015 a large majority (92 NGOs or 87.6%) received a higher amount in the latest period. The move from 
period 1 to 2 was thus beneficial for nearly nine out of ten NGOs. The switch from 2015 to 2016 (for 
those 63 NGOs that were able to tap into Dutch government funding during 2011–2015 and during 
2016–2020) was beneficial for just over half of them. With one NGO not seeing a change at all, 29 (46%) 
lost out. Of the small group of seven NGOs that received funding during 2003–2010, skipped the period 
2011–2015, and were again selected for 2016–2020, only one NGO returned with a lower annual subsidy 
and six actually gained. For all these groups combined losses range between 2% and 99% compared to 
the earlier period. Young in Prison, for instance, received an average annual subsidy of nearly €92.000 
over 2003–2010 but saw this reduced to €5.375 during 2011–2015. Gains are, however, in some cases 
substantial as well. Saferworld, for instance, went from an average annual subsidy of €74.000 (2003–
2010) to just over €1.0 million (2011–2015) and UTZ Certified from €68.000 (2011–2015) to €3.7 million 
(2016–2020) – an increase of 5.334%. 
 
Figure 8. Winners and losers per number of periods an NGO received a subsidy (2003–2020)* 
 
  Number of periods an NGO received a subsidy 
 1 2 3 
 262 (51%) 175 (36%) 73 (14%) 
Loss  43 (24%) 13 (18%) 
Profit  132 (76%) 24 (33%) 
Loss + profit   15 (20%) 
Profit + loss   21 (29%) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
* Based on average subsidy per year in each of the periods 
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 Table 3. Constant winners and losers between 2003–2010, 2011–2015, and 2016–2020 (on the basis 
 of average annual subsidy amount per period, in €)*  
 
  2003–2010 2011–2015 2016–2020 2016–2020 
 Type Average 
annual subsidy  
Loss/gain in % 
previous 
period 
Loss/gain in % 
previous 
period 
Average annual 
subsidy 
IUCN Nederland NNGO 4.809.783 +18,1% +11,7% 6.343.440 
Nederlandse Rode Kruis NNGO 1.582.680 +128,7% +3,6% 3.750.000 
IPM INGO 1.500.000 +34,7% +31,7% 2.660.000 
Stichting Aids Fonds NNGO 1.280.507 +274,9% +112,5% 10.200.600 
Milieudefensie NNGO 1.174.729 +4,5% +243,4% 4.216.780 
Both Ends  NNGO 1.039.937 +133,0% +160,9% 6.322.800 
Mama Cash NNGO 750.000 +53,1% +346,6% 5.128.000 
Transnational Institute NNGO 712.230 +61,4% +27,3% 1.463.700 
IPAS INGO 695.000 +259,7% +45,0% 3.625.000 
SOMO  NNGO 650.000 +224,1% +66,4% 3.506.000 
Kinderpostzegels Nederland  NNGO 633.653 +43.4% +146.6% 2.241.600 
AWEPA INGO 415.750 +463,0% +15,6% 2.705.020 
DNDI  INGO 371.750 +696,2% +2,7% 3.040.000 
Schone Kleren Campagne NNGO 362.518 +28,2% +28,0% 595.000 
International Alert INGO 350.000 +102,3% +17,5% 832.000 
Just Associates (JASS) INGO 187.500 +190,2% +70,8% 929.450 
Fair Wear Foundation NNGO 174.023 +133,1% +58,0% 641.000 
Dance4Life  NNGO 166.563 +311,5% +138,3% 1.633.440 
Climate Centre - Red Cross NNGO 158.059 +130,3% +56,6% 570.000 
CREA SNGO 131.250 +165,8% +59,9% 557.670 
FCAM SNGO 125.000 +368,8% +173,5% 1.602.500 
International Crisis Group  INGO 100.000 +460,0% +14,3% 640.000 
CHOICE NNGO 96.875 +310,8% +323,8% 1.686.340 
GNP living with HIV/AIDS NNGO 87.500 +433,3% +22,4% 571.257 
      
ICCO  NNGO 120.662.445 -49.4% -90.3% 5.930.627 
Oxfam Novib  NNGO 112.671.999 -34.2% -78,5% 15.911.725 
Cordaid  NNGO 108.975.196 -30.7% -82.8% 13.009.000 
SNV NNGO 84.512.412 -28,7% -88.1% 7.174.686 
Hivos NNGO 63.211.250 -16.2% -76.9% 13.231.002 
NCDO NNGO 29.300.000 -71,0% -81,2% 1.600.000 
FNV  NNGO 10.975.485 -20,1% -41.7% 5.114.930 
NIMD NNGO 6.812.500 -32,4% -19.6% 3.704.980 
Agriterra NNGO 6.812.500 -99,5% -33.3% 21.333 
HALO Trust INGO 5.232.077 -58,9% -85,7% 307.467 
CNV NNGO 5.038.615 -6,4% -26.2% 3.478.790 
Tear INGO 596.809 -16,2% -50,0% 250.000 
Stichting Heifer NNGO 154.642 -88,7% -45,2% 9.570 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016-–2020 is incomplete. 
* For determining the top 10 of winners and losers only those 32 NGOs are included that have been funded 
during all three periods and have either seen a constant increase or a constant decrease of the average annual 
subsidy during these periods.  
 
The most interesting group is the one with NGOs that have received funding in all three periods. This 
holds for a total of 73 NGOs (14.3%) including almost all major recipients. Fifteen of these lose out when 
moving from period 1 to period 2 but gain again when moving to period 3. For 21 NGOs this is exactly 
the other way around. Of the remaining 37 NGOs in this group, 24 see their average annual subsidy 
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increasing with each period and 13 see a constant decline. This latter group includes the four original 
CFOs (ICCO, Hivos, Oxfam Novib and Cordaid) and those for which an individual subsidy scheme was in 
place prior to 2016/2017 (i.e., NCDO, SNV, and the two labour unions CNV and FNV). The former group 
includes some smaller Dutch NGOs such as Aids Fonds. In terms of changes compared to the previous 
period, both losses and gains can be substantial, as Table 3 shows, indicating as well that ‘constant 
losers’ are mainly Dutch NGOs with an occasional INGO, while ‘constant winners’ is a more mixed group 
that also includes some SNGOs (see Box 7).  
 
Box 7. Financial impact of decreasing Dutch government subsidy – the case of the four original CFOs 
 
The four original CFOs (Cordaid, ICCO, Hivos and Oxfam Novib) are – together with SNV – the biggest losers of the 
changing subsidy regime of the Dutch government. Together they received between 2003 and 2010 on average 
€405 million per year, while this was €263 million over the period 2011–2015. For 2016–2020, they are now 
scheduled to receive an average annual subsidy of €47 million (but this will most likely still increase if and when 
the still open subsidy schemes have been finalised). Considering the fact that government subsidies made up 
between 91% (ICCO and Hivos) and 56% to 57% (Oxfam Novib and Cordaid) of the total income of these four CFOs 
in 2010 it thus seems logical to expect that the substantial decrease in Dutch government subsidies has had an 
enormous negative financial impact on these organisations. To check whether and to what extent this is indeed 
the case, we use the financial overviews for the period 2010–2015 provided by CBF (Central Bureau on 
Fundraising, www.cbf.nl).*  
 
Cordaid 
In 2010, the total income of Cordaid amounted to €180.7 million, of which 57.5% (€104 million) came from 
government subsidies. Most likely, nearly all of these government funds were from the Dutch government. With 
these latter government subsidies going down in 2011, total income naturally also took a dip. According to CBF 
data, Cordaid’s total income reached €111.7 million in 2011 (a decrease of 38% compared to 2010). Cordaid thus 
managed to partly compensate for the loss of government subsidies in 2011 – mainly by increasing its income 
from own fundraising and from actions of other organisations. In 2012, its total income already went up again 
reaching nearly €130 million. In 2013 and 2014, Cordaid was again at the same (or even above) total income level 
as it had been in 2010. The main reason for this fast recovery was government subsidies, in this case not from the 
Dutch but from other governments. While Dutch government subsidies did slightly increase in 2012 and then 
remained at the same level of around €79 million in 2013–2015, total income from government subsidies 
(including those from other governments) reached a staggering €130 million in 2013 and even €139 million in 
2014. In short: Cordaid compensated for decreased funding from the Dutch government principally by tapping 
into funds from other governments meaning as well that its financial dependency on governments increased from 
57.5% in 2010 to 73.7% in 2014. Its income from its own fundraising activities (and from those of or with others) 
at the same time decreased by €5 million over 2012–2014, while its income from investments went up with 342%. 
 
ICCO 
In contrast to Cordaid, ICCO has not regained its full financial strength after the cut in government funding in 
2011, although the loss in Dutch government funding was largely replaced. Its total income of more than €103 
million in 2010 decreased to €70 million in 2011 but went up again in 2012 to €97 million. In 2013 and 2014, the 
organisation each year lost a few million from its total budget. This development in total income is in line with 
those in subsidies from governments that after the dip in 2011 went up again, but was not sufficient to regain the 
relatively high level of governmental funding in 2010. This suggests that its dependency on official funding sources 
is still high (although it did decrease from 91% in 2010 to 85% in 2014) and that also ICCO compensated for 
decreasing Dutch government funding by looking for funds from other governments. The latter is strengthened by 
the fact that its income from own fundraising activities increased from €240.000 in 2010 and 2011 to around 
€500.000 in 2012 and 2013 but was down to below the 2010 level again in 2014.  
 
Oxfam Novib 
In terms of both total income and subsidies from governments, Oxfam Novib equals Cordaid. A dip in 2011 (with a 
loss of 27% in total income and of 34% in government subsidies) is thus followed by a quick recovery – even to 
such an extent that total income (and also income from government subsidies) was already higher in 2013 than in 
2010. In 2010, Oxfam Novib’s total income amounted to €177 million; in 2013 it reached €207 million. As with 
Cordaid and ICCO, this increase has mainly been possible by tapping into alternative government funding (from 
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€100 million in 2010 to €66 million in 2011 to €129 million in 2013). The fact that its dependency rate on 
governmental funding increased from 56% in 2010 to 65% in 2014 shows that also Oxfam Novib relies heavily on 
other governments to compensate for the loss of Dutch government funding. Still, this dependency rate is the 
lowest of the four CFOs.  
 
Hivos 
While also Hivos saw a decline in Dutch government funding from 2010 to 2011 (losing some 16% and staying at 
that lower level for the entire period up to 2015), its total subsidies from governments were actually higher in 
2011 than they were in 2010. In contrast to the other three, Hivos is therefore also the only CFO that did not see a 
decrease in total revenues in 2011 but instead a substantial and continuing increase from €75 million in 2010 to 
€141 million in 2014. The organisation thus offset declined funding by the Dutch government immediately by 
increased funding from other governments. Its dependency rate on government funding was high (91% in 2010) 
and has even grown (96% in 2014). Not surprisingly, its own fundraising activities only bring in a small percentage 
and in absolute terms have remained at the same level of around €1.5 million per year. 
 
All in all, it took three of the four original CFOs two years to recover from the cut in Dutch government funding in 
2011, while Hivos actually managed to tap into other sources immediately. With the exception of ICCO all came 
out even better (in financial terms) than before (see Figure 3.1). Interestingly, the decline in Dutch government 
funding has mainly been mitigated by tapping into alternative government funding.  
 
Figure 3.1 Total budget of the four ‘original’ CFOs – 2010-2014 (in € million) 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on CBF data 
 
Increasing dependency on government funding is not restricted to the four CFOs, however. Annex 3 provides an 
overview of the changes in this dependency rate on government subsidies from 2010 and 2014 for those non-
CFOs included in both the government NGO funding database and the CBF database in 2010 and 2014. Of the 
total 67 NNGOs, 41.8% (28 NNGOs) had a lower dependency rate in 2014 than they had in 2010 and two saw no 
change (i.e., they were not subsidised by governments in 2010 nor were they in 2014). The remaining 36 (53.7%) 
were more dependent on government funds in 2014 than they were in 2010. As a group, these 67 NGOs saw their 
dependency rate increase from 53.4% to 61.5% between 2010 and 2014. The idea of former secretary of state 
Knapen that NGOs should rely much more on funding from the general public has thus not worked out in practice 
– neither for the four CFOs nor for a large number of other Dutch NGOs.  
 
Whether the former CFOs can do the trick again after the further decrease in Dutch government funding in 2016 
remains to be seen. Hivos, for instance, in 2011–2015 ‘only’ had to mitigate a loss of €10 million annually; from 
2016 onwards it has to find an annual sum of €40 million elsewhere. For ICCO (€55 million) and Oxfam Novib and 
Cordaid (each €70 million) this is even more. The question should be asked not only how sustainable these 
alternative governmental funds are in the mid- to long-term but also what costs they incur – not only in terms of 
money needed to bid for these alternative funds (without any assurance that these investments will pay off) but 
also in terms of autonomy and ‘room to manoeuvre’. Do these alternative government funds not come with the 
catch that they are meant to implement predetermined project interventions, meaning as well that NGOs lose out 
in flexibility?  
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In addition, there remains the question of staff. The De Volkskrant article mentioned in the introduction talks 
about a ‘major layoff from the biggest aid organisations’. Although this is quite possible (and perhaps even likely) 
to happen from 2016 onwards, it is interesting to note that in the period 2010–2015 the four CFOs have grown 
(sometimes substantially) in terms of staff. In 2010, Hivos had a total of 256 employees with just over half of them 
working in regional or country offices in the Global South and the other half in The Hague at the head office. In 
2014, the Hivos organisation counted 339 employees (of whom 54.5% were working abroad and 45.5% in The 
Hague). Cordaid in the meantime went from 523 (271 in the head office in The Hague and 252 in the Global 
South) in 2012 to 536 (282 + 254) in 2014, while Oxfam Novib increased its staff by nearly 75% between 2010 and 
2014 (i.e., with staff at the head office decreasing slightly from 343 to 329 but those working in country offices in 
the Global South increasing from 121 to 481). Even ICCO saw an increase in staff from 280 in 2011 to 351 in 2014 
and also here the regional offices grew (from 155 staff members to 256), while those in the head office in Utrecht 
decreased from 135 to 95.  
 
These staff changes reflect not only the changing financial position but also (and more importantly) changes in the 
organisational structure and in CFOs’ strategies in adapting to changing circumstances. As such, these changes 
might mask a reshuffling of staff that has taken place (e.g., replacement of existing staff by new staff with specific 
thematic knowledge and expertise or the replacement by head office staff by field office staff) and a layoff of staff 
at headquarters. Hivos, for instance, has continued and speeded up its decentralisation to regional and country 
offices as did Oxfam Novib and ICCO. Cordaid in the meantime has embarked on a route of dividing its 
organisation into business units that are meant to be self-reliant. All in all, the four CFOs acknowledge the need 
for change and have (each in their own way) started the process of ‘reinventing’ themselves (also see: Elbers & 
Schulpen 2015). What exactly changed, what (possible) consequences these changes have, and to what extent all 
this is linked up with changes in the Dutch government funding structure will be part of follow-up research. 
 
* CBF makes a distinction between income from (1) lotteries (e.g., National Postcode Lottery), (2) fundraising 
 (e.g., bequests, mailings, collections), (3) campaigns of or with others, (4) investments, and (5) subsidies from 
 governments. The latter is used in the plural form meaning that it covers all income from any government or 
 governmental body (e.g., the EU). ‘Subsidies from governments’ is thus not restricted to the Dutch government. 
 
Duration 
Not only are most of the NGOs supported of Dutch origin, and receive the majority of funding, but these 
Dutch NGOs are also able to tap into more subsidy schemes than both INGOs and SNGOs. In addition, 
more of them manage to tap into the available subsidy schemes for a longer time. To start with the 
latter, Figure 9 illustrates that overall most NGOs are able to tap into Dutch government funding for up 
to five (often consecutive) years over the entire period 2003–2020. This holds for 55% of NNGOs, 68% of 
INGOs and 59% of SNGOs. In contrast, 27% of NNGOs managed to receive funding in this period for ten 
to 18 years, while this is only 10% for INGOs and 4.5% for SNGOs.  
 
The number of schemes NGOs manage to tap into between 2003 and 2020 ranges between one and ten. 
Overall, 65% of all NGOs receive funding from one specific scheme only. A substantial part (97 NGOs, 
19%) receives funding from two schemes, however, and the remaining 16% receives funding from three 
to ten schemes. Figures 10 provides an overview showing that only Dutch NGOs indeed tap into more 
than five schemes, that only a handful of SNGOs manages more than one, and that a few INGOs reach 
up to five different schemes. It should be noted that this is an unequal game by definition. Of the 47 
subsidy schemes included here, seven are only meant for INGOs and 17 are only used by NNGOs. There 
are, up to now, no specific central schemes meant only (or used) by SNGOs. In fact, there are only eight 
schemes in which also SNGOs are beneficiaries, while there are 23 that are used by both INGOs and 
NNGOs. Besides, the subsidy schemes open (only) for Dutch NGOs tend to be the bigger ones in terms of 
total funds available. The 17 subsidy schemes that are exclusively used by Dutch NGOs have a monetary 
value of €3.6 billion (an average of almost €215 million). In contrast, the seven schemes only used by 
INGOs amount to €422 million (an average of €60 million). 
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Figure 9. Number of years an NGO receives a subsidy, per type of NGO (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
Figure 10. Number of schemes used by type of NGO (2003–2016), in % of type 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
 
2.3 Subsidy schemes and themes 
Overall, the subsidy schemes included in our analysis can be divided into three groups (see Table 4 
providing an overview of these groups and Annex 2 for more detailed information about types of NGOs 
making use of different schemes). The first then covers the major schemes running from MFP (2003–
2006) via MFS-1 (2007–2010) (and including the Young & Innovative scheme which can be seen as an 
addition to MFS-1), and MFS-2 (2011–2015) to D&D (2016–2020). Together these major schemes take 
up 64% of all government funding for the period 2003–2020. Under these schemes, a total of 135 
different NGOs have been funded over the years, the majority of which is of Dutch origin (118 or 87.4%). 
Only 13 are INGOs and only four are from the South with the majority of INGOs and all SNGOs being 
added from 2016 onwards. Whereas MFP was restricted to six organisations, MFS-1 introduced an open 
competition that was (with some alterations) maintained for MFS-2 and D&D. Of the 74 NGOs funded 
under MFS-1 (including Y&I) 47.3% (35) managed to also tap into MFS-2 and 25.7% (19) continued into 
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D&D. This includes five of the six MFP grantees with only Plan Nederland having been excluded in the 
MFS-1 scheme. All in all, the four major NGO funding schemes have combined consistency in terms of 
which NGOs receive funding with a substantial rejuvenation with each successive scheme. Of the 67 
NGOs funded under MFS-2, 32 (47.7%) were not part of MFS-1, Y&I or MFP, and of the 62 NGOs under 
D&D half was not part of MFS-2 (see Figure 11 below). This does not mean, however, that some of them 
did not manage to tap into other (minor) schemes. 
 
Table 4. Major, thematic/minor and individual NGO funding schemes (2003–2015)* 
 
 
Scheme # NGOs Subsidy (€) Period 
Major schemes 
  
 
1 MFP**  6 1.637.600.000 2003–2006 
2 MFS-1 59 2.173.207.421 2007–2010 
3 Y&I*** 15 16.126.875 2009–2010 
4 MFS-2 67 1.915.843.603 2011–2015 
5 D&D 61 923.050.000 2016–2020 
 
Subtotal major schemes 
 
6.665.827.899   
 
In % grand total 
 
62.4%  
    
 
Thematic/minor 
  
 
General  
  
 
6 TMF-1 63 172.813.583 2003–2006 
7 TMF-2 65 158.546.891 2004–2007 
8 TMF-3 66 156.452.079 2005–2008 
9 TMF-4 32 153.800.949 2006–2010 
10 SALIN 20 86.105.000 2007–2010 
11 Schokland 9 8.607.608 2008–2010 
    
 
Sexual and Reproductive Health & Rights 
  
 
12 MDG3 46 69.954.678 2009–2011 
13 FLOW-1  33 80.875.106  2012–2015 
14 KPF 7 34.999.998 2012–2015 
15 COF 4 50.000.000 2011–2015 
16 SRGR-1 9 124.849.998 2013–2015 
17 SRGR-2 32 284.999.999 2016–2020 
18 POP 1 50.000.000 2007–2010 
19 PDP-1  8 80.768.884 2006–2009 
20 PDP-2 7 69.600.000 2010–2014 
21 PDP-3 6 86.300.000 2015–2020 
22 CMF 12 6.000.000 2014–2015 
23 Opstap 2 6.000.000 2013–2015 
24 NGO coord. 1 1.000.000 2012–2015 
25 FLOW-2 14 95.000.000 2016–2020 
    
 
Humanitarian aid / crisis / conflict 
  
 
26 HA 15 39.527.302 2005–2010 
27 HD-M 8 88.730.543 2003–2010 
28 HD-M&CA 4 45.000.000 2012–2016 
29 EFV  4 24.136.000 2012–2013 
30 Weder 21 126.961.637 2012–2015 
31 Syria  4 13.988.845 2014–2016 
32 SPCC  7 26.250.000 2014-2016 
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Scheme # NGOs Subsidy (€) Period 
Human rights 
  
 
33 HRF-1 7 10.812.144 2012–2015 
    
 
Political cooperation 
  
 
34 PP-1 1 37.500.000 2007–2010 
35 PP-2 5 32.300.000 2012–2015 
    
 
Migration 
  
 
36 Mig.-1  16 5.465.568 2006–2008 
    
 
Sustainable energy 
  
 
37 Daey Ouwens 15 4.992.743 2008-2012 
    
 
Global citizenship 
  
 
38 SBOS 59 26.956.334 2010–2011 
    
 
Sustainable water 
  
 
39 FDW 16 12.804.877 2013–2020 
    
 
Food security 
  
 
40 FDOV 52 39.824.082 2012–2021 
 
Subtotal thematic/minor schemes 
 
2.311.924.848  
 
In % grand total 
 
21.6%  
    
 
Individual schemes**** 
  
 
41 SNV 1 974.893.677 2003–2015 
42 NCDO-1 1 234.400.000 2003–2010 
43 NCDO-2 1 50.500.000 2011–2017 
44 PSO 1 220.550.576 2003–2010 
45 VMP-1 2 158.775.596 2003–2012 
46 VMP-2  2 49.010.000 2013–2016 
47 LGCP-VNG 1 22.500.000 2012–2016 
 
Subtotal individual schemes 
 
1.710.629.849  
 
In % grand total 
 
16.0%  
 
GRAND TOTAL 
 
10.688.382.596   
 
* Only those schemes have been included for which data is available. 
** For the period 2003–2006 only. The MFP started in 1965. 
*** J&V (Young & Innovative) essentially is an addition to MFS-1, set up when it became clear that under MFS-
 1 young organisations lacking a track record were at a disadvantage. It is generally seen as part of the 
 MFS-1 system. 
**** Funding for all individual schemes started before 2003 and over the years several extensions have 
 been made (each with a specific period and a specific amount). In the case of SNV the latest extension 
(and also the final one) was for the period 2007–2015 with an annual budget of some €75 million. Since 
2016, SNV will be subsidised under the D&D programme. The same holds for PSO (last period of funding 
2007–2010 with an annual budget of approximately €27 million). NCDO has been funded since the 1970s 
and for a large part is now supposed to ‘survive in the market’. The latest funding period was for 2011–
2014, then extended up to the end of 2017. VNG received its first ‘individual funding’ in 2012 but received 
earlier funding under the TMF programme. VMP (meant for the two major Dutch labour unions) has been 
extended again in 2013. This programme expires at the end of 2016. In the meantime, both labour unions 
are also part of the D&D scheme for the period 2016–2020.  
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Figure 11. Consistency and renewal in the four major NGO schemes 
 
Programme NGOs    Total # NGOs 
MFP 6    6 
  New NGOs*    
MFS-1 5 69   74 
   New NGOs*   
MFS-2 5 30 32  67 
    New NGOs*  
D&D 5 14 13 30 62 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
* New in terms of not having been part of the previous major scheme 
 
Second come the thematic or minor schemes under which still substantial sums have been made 
available over the years to hundreds of Dutch, international and Southern NGOs. This group covers the 
bulk of schemes sometimes meant for specific groups of NGOs (i.e., SALIN was only meant for 
international NGOs that were no longer eligible to receive funding under TMF) and mostly for specific 
themes (e.g., migration or gender). It includes as well a few schemes specifically aimed at contributing to 
public-private cooperation, which falls under the broad heading of private sector development. NGOs 
are thus also part of private (commercial) sector-oriented programmes such as FDW and FDOV. 
Principally, they can also apply under the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) although up to now none of 
the NGO applications under this fund has been approved because they ‘have less or shorter experience 
with investments [and] DGGF follows a commercial approach based on loans, guarantees and 
participations instead of subsidies’ (DGIS 2015: 4). Some of these recipient NGOs manage to tap into 
several thematic schemes in a row, other manage to tap into several simultaneously and again others 
are only funded by one specific scheme. Looking at the four (more general) thematic funding schemes 
known as TMF-1 to TMF-4 shows this diversity quite clearly. Of the 63 NGOs under TMF-1, five managed 
to also tap into TMF-2 (of which one also into TMF-4), two into TMF-3 and four into TMF-4. At the same 
time, one-third of the TMF-1 NGOs was also part of MFS-1 with 16 continuing up to MFS-2.  
 
Table 5. Number of thematic/minor schemes per type of NGO (in # NGOs) 
 
 Number of minor/thematic schemes 
Type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
NNGOs 36 161 28 15 7 8 1  1 
INGOs 3 132 37 10 4 1    
SNGOs 2 55 9       
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
 
In total 469 NGOs participate(d) in at least one of the 35 thematic (or minor) schemes (meaning as well 
that a large part of those that are or were part of major or individual schemes have also managed to be 
part of these thematic ones). Just over 74% (348) indeed only taps into one specific minor or thematic 
scheme and these include the majority of INGOs (70%) and SNGOs (83%). Table 5 clearly shows the 
skewed division between the number of thematic/minor schemes that different types of NGOs manage 
to get funding from. Important to note is that there is a relatively small group of mainly Dutch NGOs that 
not only is part of several thematic schemes but also of many (if not all) major schemes. This holds, for 
instance, for the six organisations in MFP (the original CFOs plus Plan and Terre des Hommes) that also 
manage to get funding under such diverse thematic schemes as SBOS, SRGR, Opstap, FDOV, HA and/or 
migration.  
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The third group are individual schemes meant for specific Dutch organisations (i.e., NCDO, PSO, SNV, 
VMP – designed for the two major Dutch labour unions FNV and CNV – and a specific programme for 
VNG). Although these organisations started to receive funding already years ago (e.g., NCDO and VMP in 
the mid-1970s), all of these individual schemes terminate either in 2015 or 2016 with the exception of 
NCDO, which runs up to 2017, and PSO, which ceased getting government funding in 2010 (after which 
the organisation itself was dissolved as well). And again with the exception of NCDO, all of them have 
managed to tap into other schemes as well. Both FNV and CNV are now part of the D&D programme, 
VNG participated in three other schemes besides its ‘individual’ one, SNV is also part of FDOV and D&D, 
and PSO supplemented its individual schemes with funding under the migration scheme.  
 
Finally, a fourth group concerns direct funding of SNGOs. The word ‘group’ is perhaps a bit misleading 
here as there is only one specific scheme meant for direct funding: the Accountability Fund administered 
by Dutch embassies. Officially, this fund will start operating in 2016 and will run for a period of five years 
with an annual budget of €15 million. It should be stressed that the Accountability Fund may be the first 
official direct funding scheme (and the first setting out policy guidelines for direct funding) but that 
SNGOs have been funded directly also before 2016. Not only have some of them managed to tap into 
other schemes in the past and present (e.g., TMF, FLOW, D&D) but Dutch embassies have been funding 
local organisations already for years. Box 8 delves a bit deeper into NGO funding by Dutch embassies 
and thus into decentralised NGO funding (which is a much better term to use than direct funding).  
 
Box 8. Decentralised funding of NGOs 
 
Interestingly, there is always discussion regarding which NGOs to include under the heading of direct funding. 
Data for the year 2000, for instance, show that €166.9 million went into direct funding of which €65 million went 
towards local NGOs, €43 million towards Dutch NGOs and the remaining €58.9 million towards international 
NGOs (Schulpen et al. 2009). The question, of course, is whether ‘direct funding’ is actually an applicable term for 
funds that still go through either Dutch or international NGOs. In essence, the IOB (2014) uses a broad definition 
of direct funding, including all funds going to NGOs (Dutch, international or Southern ones) from the delegated 
funds of Dutch embassies in developing countries.  
 
Table 8.1 Decentralised funding: # of NGOs and subsidy amount per year (in million €) – 2010–2015 
  
Source: based on data provided by DGIS 
 
Following such a broad definition, the IOB study determined that ‘in absolute amounts, direct funding increased in 
the period 2006–2012, although it declined between 2009 and 2011’ but also that it increased from 2008 onwards 
‘as a percentage of decentralised expenditure’ (IOB 2014: 13). Of the decentralised funds of Dutch embassies in 
18 developing countries, 24% (€950 million) was spent by NGOs. Still, the largest part thereof went not to SNGOs 
but to NNGOs and INGOs. Southern NGOs directly received ‘only’ 37% (€350 million) of that amount. Important as 
well is the finding that ‘trends in the amounts and percentages of direct funding over the years differed greatly 
between countries’ and that ‘there is no clear relationship between the volume of direct funding on the one hand 
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and, on the other hand, the recipient country’s socioeconomic context and the room for civil society in that 
country’ (ibid.: 13). 
 
DAC data on funding to ‘developing country-based NGOs’ – thus using a more narrow definition – in the 
meantime show that direct funding by the Netherlands in absolute terms increased between 2009 and 2012 and 
then decreased in 2013 to about the same level as was reached in 2010. In contrast, total DAC direct funding ‘is 
clearly on the rise [but] this is due to two main actors: the EU en UK’ (Huyse & De Bruyn 2015: 11–12).  
 
Moving back to the Netherlands and taking as a starting point that direct funding equals all funds NGOs receive 
through Dutch embassies (i.e., from their delegated funds), expenditure data from the internal administration of 
the ministry reveals that over the period 2010–2015 a total of 797 NGOs have been supported. Together they 
received a subsidy of just over €1.2 billion over this entire period (or on average approximately €200 million per 
year). In reality, this decentralised funding by Dutch embassies shows a declining trend: in 2010 NGOs still 
received €238 million from the embassies, and in 2015 this was down to €162 million. Table 5.1 shows the 
number of NGOs and the total subsidy amount per year for the period 2010–2015.  
 
It is interesting to note that as a percentage of the total ODA funds administered by the embassies, NGOs have 
become more important (although this is from a sharply reduced total budget, which halved over 2010–2015 and 
went from €982 million to €464 million). Since 2013, as Table 8.2 indicates, NGOs are the biggest recipients of RNE 
funding mainly because of the spectacular decrease in funding going to governments (from 49% in 2010 to 26% in 
2015). Also research institutes have become a more favoured channel for RNEs, with a threefold increase in terms 
of percentage since 2010 (and in absolute terms from €50 to €67 million). Multilateral organisations remained at 
around 20% of RNE funding but in absolute terms lost €100 million over this six-year period. 
 
Table 8.2 ODA expenditure of Dutch embassies, per channel, in % total funding by RNEs (2010–2015) 
 
Source: based on data provided by DGIS 
 
Of the 797 NGOs supported by Dutch embassies the majority (628 or 78.6%) can be classified as Southern NGOs 
(SNGOs) based on where their headquarters are located. Of the remaining 169, slightly more than half (88) are 
INGOs and 81 are Dutch NGOs (NNGOs). Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the average subsidy amount per SNGO 
is substantially lower than that for INGOs or NNGOs. The 81 NNGOs received (over the entire period of 2010–
2015) some €220.4 million from embassies, on average thus €2.7 million. The 88 INGOs fare better with a total 
amount of €332.4 million and an average of €3.8 million. The SNGOs receive the highest amount as a group 
(€649.7 million) but since that is divided among a total of 628 organisations each receives about €1.0 million on 
average. These averages are, as so often, misleading. In reality, the total subsidy that individual NNGOs received 
from the Dutch embassies ranges from €4.700 (Stichting African Architecture Matters) to €45.9 million (Save the 
Children), among INGOs from €3.125 (PACTA Finland) to €70.8 million (International Fertiliser Development 
Center), and among SNGOs from €686 (Centro de Atencion) to €78.7 million (BRAC). 
 
For a substantial number of NGOs the funds received from the embassies concern additional Dutch funding as 
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they are also recipients of centrally administered subsidies from The Hague. The NGOs that manage to tap into 
embassy funds as well as those of The Hague are mainly NNGOs and INGOs. Forty-two of the 81 Dutch NGOs are 
recipients of both centralised funds (administered by The Hague) and decentralised funds (administered by the 
embassies). The same holds for 28 of the 88 INGOs and three of the 628 SNGOs.  
 
In effect it means that a Dutch NGO such as ICCO can add an amount of €33.5 million in decentralised funding to 
its €316.8 million in centralised funding over 2010–2015 – an additional 10.6%. Population Services International – 
an INGO that managed €17.2 million via centralised funding under SALIN and COF during 2010–2015 – received an 
additional €58.5 million in Dutch funding via decentralised funds over that same period. 
 
Overall, the period from 2013 onwards shows an increasing thematic focus in the subsidy schemes. The 
major schemes (running from MFP to D&D) generally are not thematically oriented although over the 
years the assessment criteria for these schemes have become stricter, with the thematic focus of the 
governmental development policy gradually being used as a yardstick. Still, the freedom of the NGOs 
under these major schemes to choose their own thematic focus (if any) is generally quite substantial. 
This also holds for the more recent D&D programme, which has an exclusive focus on (capacity building 
in the field of) lobbying and advocacy, but is relatively free in the choice in which sector(s) such advocacy 
activities have to be undertaken as long as they are ‘connected with the broad policy agenda of foreign 
trade and development cooperation, as set out in the policy document “A World to Gain”’ (DGIS 2014). 
Thematically, this policy document focuses on water, food security, women’s rights and sexual and 
reproductive rights, and security and the rule of law but provides opportunities for other thematic entry 
points as well. 
 
The relative freedom of NGOs to choose their own thematic focus broadly holds as well for the 
individual schemes where the mandate of the concerned NGOs determines in what ‘thematic’ field they 
work (e.g., NCDO principally working in the field of raising awareness and public support, and the labour 
unions under the successive VMP programmes working on supporting their labour union counterparts in 
developing countries). And it also holds for those schemes grouped under the general thematic (or 
minor) ones. TMF is a point in case here. Although called Thematic Co-financing, the TMF sequence 
leaves the choice in which specific theme(s) an NGO wants to work essentially to the NGO itself.  
 
In more recent years, this situation has changed dramatically. The more general thematic schemes of 
TMF and SALIN terminated in 2010 and the last individual scheme will be phased out in 2017. In 
addition, the general subsidy regulations and the Standard Scheme stipulate more clearly the thematic 
fields in which the ministry can set up subsidy schemes. Table 4 showed that this has particularly been 
worked out in the field of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) with 14 separate schemes. 
But also in the broad field of humanitarian, crisis and conflict aid, the ministry over the years has 
developed several schemes – some specifically meant for one country (Syria) and others for de-mining.  
 
All in all, the underlying idea that the ministry follows its own policy to determine in which theme it 
wants to include NGOs has been given shape in more recent years. As a consequence, earmarked 
funding (in DAC terms called ‘aid through NGOs’ where the NGO essentially is a contractor for 
programmes designed by the donor) has grown at the expense of core funding (or ‘aid to NGOs’ where a 
donor supports a programme of an NGO) (also see Annex 4 for a brief discussion on this).  
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Concluding remarks 
The above analysis shows that the De Volkskrant was correct: the big (traditional) NGOs are about to 
lose out tremendously because of the general cuts in the development budget and the changing subsidy 
structure. The process leading up to these latest budget cuts was, however, already set in motion years 
ago. Already in 2011 these major Dutch NGOs received millions less than they were used to in the years 
before. At the same time, there are and have been also winners in this ‘funding game’ and some of them 
have seen a spectacular growth in Dutch government funding. Yet, the winners are generally smaller 
NGOs and their funding from the Dutch government may have increased but these ‘profits’ come 
nowhere near the ‘losses’ that occurred elsewhere in the NGO community. From a more positive 
perspective, the increase in Southern NGOs being able to tap into Dutch government funding can be 
noted, although that growth is extremely slow and FLOW-2 was heavily criticised for not selecting any of 
the SNGO proposals. Besides, Dutch NGOs still get the largest piece of the pie and manage to tap into 
substantial more schemes than INGOs and SNGOs combined.  
 
Interestingly, the calls for a further streamlining of NGO funding that were made in the early 2000s have 
led in practice to a highly fragmented funding scene with an ever-increasing number of relatively small 
schemes, an only slowly reducing number of NGOs supported, and a high number of NGOs receiving 
only small amounts in subsidy. This fragmentation is then even more worrisome considering the fact 
that centralised funding to Dutch, international and Southern NGOs has seen a substantial decline from 
an average annual contribution of €776 million over 2003–2010 via €602 million over 2011-2015 to just 
over €300 million over 2016–2020. Several NGOs seem to have managed the first downturn in 
government funding in 2011 quite well as they were able to tap into other governments’ funding 
systems. The 50% cut in 2016 is, however, much more severe than the one of 2011 and it remains to be 
seen whether the majority of NGOs will manage to mitigate the latest cuts as well as they obviously did 
in 2011.  
 
Depending on one’s (political) viewpoint, the budget cuts are either a correction of a system of NGO 
funding that went out of control quite some time ago, the unfair outcome of more general cuts in the 
budget for development cooperation for which NGOs paid the highest price, or an expression of 
unreliability of a government that over the past 50 years has been co-responsible for the growth of 
several of the Dutch NGOs that are now hit the hardest. Instead of adding to this controversy, it is more 
important to point out two fundamental and highly interrelated policy shifts, which underlie these 
budget cuts and in the longer run might turn out to be far more critical than the loss of money.  
 
The first of these policy shifts refers to the now institutionalised idea of competition, result orientation 
and the accompanying tendering system. It reflects what some would call ‘managerialism’, in which the 
idea of development as a ‘political process to change unequal power relations’ is replaced by the idea 
that ‘development can be planned and measured’ and where NGOs ‘implement contractually specified 
activities’ (Elbers et al. 2014). The idea of NGOs competing for scarce resources on the basis of their 
added value and track record perhaps sounds like a good idea but it also might have serious negative 
consequences. It might, for instance, run counter to the idea of cooperation that is simultaneously 
promoted (e.g., by emphasising public-private partnerships or working in consortia when applying for 
funding) or the idea of predictability that is one of the central elements in the Paris/Accra/Busan-system 
of increasing the effectiveness of aid. In addition, it also makes NGOs into entrepreneurs who adapt 
their own programme and strategy for the sake of securing outside funding, funding that is likely to be 
increasingly project-based thus reducing the ability of an NGO to set its own agenda, and requires 
increasing investments in drafting proposals that are often not bringing in any rewards. 
 
The latter links up to the second shift from a system in which the autonomy of NGOs was central to one 
in which government policy is central. Under the earlier MFP, the four CFOs essentially determined 
themselves where, with whom and on what they would be working, and the government assessed these 
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programmes only on a very general level. They were principally free in their policy and strategy choices. 
This already changed substantially with the introduction of MFS-1 and MFS-2 when assessment of their 
proposals was increasingly based on the idea of quality and competition. Perhaps even more important 
was that the government also steered these proposals in specific directions (e.g., by determining to a 
larger extent than before that a specific part of the subsidy should be spent in a limited number of 
countries, by preferring proposals of alliances and not of single NGOs, and by emphasising the 
importance of the sectoral spearheads of Dutch government policy). 
 
The latest major scheme (D&D, 2016–2020) can be seen as a further step on this path of making 
government policy more central. The D&D programme not only determines that all NGOs that want to 
join the D&D scheme need to implement their programme in ‘partnership’ with the government, but it 
also quite clearly establishes that specific activities (e.g., in the field of service delivery, which historically 
was always one of the most important types of activities funded under TMF and the MFS schemes) are 
no longer eligible for government funding. This is in sharp contrast to the UK where recent regulations 
state ‘that DFID funding can no longer be used by CSOs to set up any lobby & advocacy activities which 
target the UK government [and which tend] to push them further into more technical, apolitical roles’ 
(Huyse & De Bruyn 2015: 14). By determining what will not be funded, the government naturally and at 
the same time decides what will be funded (in this case: strengthening of local organisations in the field 
of lobby and advocacy). From an ‘autonomy’ idea the compulsory partnerships with the ministry in 
designing and implementing a programme might also be seen more positively as such partnerships imply 
an idea of equality and should clearly take the specific roles of both partners as a starting point.  
 
Some would say that in taking the government policy more strongly as a point of departure for NGO 
funding that same government shows it increasingly views NGOs as an implementing arm of its own 
policy. Such a view then injures the autonomy idea that implicitly formed the basis of earlier NGO 
funding and was officially laid down in a 2001 policy paper as well as in the idea of ‘actors in their own 
right’ as expressed at the Accra Agenda for Action conference in 2008 and the Busan conference in 2011. 
Whether or not this is correct, it is interesting to see that in its reporting on NGO funding to the DAC the 
Dutch government clearly indicates a move from ‘aid to NGOs’ towards ‘aid through NGOs’ and that 
even our own more conservative estimate shows a gradual move away from ‘aid to’. Overall, this 
difference is seen as a one between providing core support for activities ‘programmed by the NGOs’ and 
providing earmarked funding to NGOs ‘to implement donor-initiated projects’. 
 
Limiting their own room of manoeuvre (or ‘strategic space’ as the NGO branch organisation Partos called 
it) is thus not a new phenomenon but essentially part and parcel of all steps taken over the years since 
2001. Not surprisingly, Partos in a 2009 letter to then Minister Koenders stated that the ‘positive vision 
[with regard to the independent role of NGOs in the 2009 policy paper of Koenders] did not materialise 
in all aspects of the proposed policy’. In fact, they felt that the paper even ‘presupposes [...] a certain 
obedience of civil society organisations to the government’. The government obviously was and is again 
at the steering wheel – at least for those organisations wishing to tap into the numerous subsidy 
schemes that simultaneously were created. 
 
In the end the question of course is as well how all these changes impact the NGOs that are or were part 
of the Dutch NGO funding system. In what way do they react to the decrease in government funding (or 
to the increase of the same) at an organisational and strategic level? Equally, if not more, important is 
the question how these changes impact the Southern partners of (certainly also the Dutch) NGOs that 
have been funded earlier but have now been kicked out of the government system or have seen a 
sharply reduced budget. Such questions are particularly important because of the relatively high 
dependency of Dutch NGOs on government funding and the fact that Dutch NGOs tend not to be 
implementing but supporting NGOs (i.e., they generally work through providing funds to Southern 
partners to implement programmes and projects). These are questions that cannot be answered yet 
(but see Box 7 for a start) and certainly need further exploring.  
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Afterword 
One of the problems any researcher delving into an ongoing process will recognise is that new data will 
continue to pop up, which will require a re-analysis of the entire dataset. In effect, it also means that it is 
never finished. To prevent the latter, an artificial deadline in data collection was set on April 1, 2016. For 
this first phase of the research into the changes in the (Dutch) NGO sector, this means that subsidies 
that are granted under any of the still outstanding schemes (e.g., Voice, Account., ARC Fund, MA&C) are 
not included here but have to await a possible future update. Unfortunately this also holds for the LEAD 
scheme, which only came to our attention after the first of April but the selection process of which was 
actually already finalised at the end of 2015. Suffice to say here now is that inclusion of LEAD in the 
dataset results in a minor increase in the total number of NGO recipients (from 510 to at least 514, 
including three SNGOs), a growth in the total government subsidy to Oxfam Novib and Hivos of around 
€1.5 million per year over the period 2016–2018, and the inclusion of SPARK and SOS Kinderdorpen also 
in the period 2016–2020 as recipients of government funding. All of this would mean minor changes to 
the data presented in, for instance, Box 7, Table 2 and Table 3 but not an overhaul of the main findings 
presented above. 
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Annex 1. Overview of the NGO funding schemes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 (2003–2020) (in million €) 
 
 Name Period Amount  # NGOs 
    Total NNGO INGO SNGO 
1 SNV 2003–2015 974.9 1 1 - - 
2 NCDO-1 2003–2010 234.4 1 1 - - 
3 PSO 2003–2010 220.6 1 1 - - 
4 VMP-1 2003–2012 158.8 2 2 - - 
5 MFP 2003–2006 1,637.6 6 6 - - 
6 HD-M 2003–2010 88.7 8 1 7 - 
7 TMF-1 2003–2006 172.8 63 40 23 - 
8 TMF-2 2004–2007 158.5 65 23 41 1 
9 TMF-3 2005–2008 156.4 66 28 38 - 
10 HA 2005–2010 39.5 15 7 8 - 
11 TMF-4 2006–2010 153.8 32 32 - - 
12 SALIN 2006–2010 86.1 20 - 20 - 
13 PDP-1 2006–2009 80.8 8 - 8 - 
14 Mig.-1  2007–2008 5.5 16 15 1 - 
15 MFS-1 2007–2010 2,173.2 59 56 3 - 
16 PP-1 2007–2010 37.5 1 1 - - 
17 POP  2007–2010 50.0 1 1 - - 
18 Schokland 2008–2010 8.6 9 9 - - 
19 Daey Ouwens 2008–2012 5.0 15 7 4 4 
20 Y&I 2009–2010 16.1 15 15 - - 
21 MDG3 2009–2010 69.9  46 2 21 23 
22 SBOS  2010–2011 26.9 59 59 - - 
23 MFS-2 2011–2015 1,915.8 67 64 3 - 
24 COF 2011–2015 50.0 4 - 4 - 
25 PDP-2 2011–2014 69.6 7 - 7 - 
26 NCDO-2 2011–2017 50.5 1 1 - - 
27 KPF 2012–2015 35.0 7 6 1 - 
28 FLOW-1  2012–2015 80.9 33 1 19 13 
29 HRF-1 2012–2015 10.8  7 4 3 - 
30 Weder  2012–2015 127.0 21 14 7 - 
31 LGCP-VNG 2012–2016  22.5 1 1 - - 
32 NGO coord.  2012–2015  1.0 1 1 - - 
33 HD-M&CA  2012–2016 45.0 4 - 4 - 
34 FDOV 2012–2021 39.8 52 21 5 26 
35 PP-2 2013–2015 32.3 5 3 2 - 
36 SRGR-1 2013–2015 124.8 9 6 3 - 
37 Opstap 2013–2015 6.0 2 2 - - 
38 FDW 2013–2020 12.8 16 10 1 5 
39 EFV 2013–2019 24.1 4 - 4 - 
40 VMP-2 2013–2016 49.0 2 2 - - 
41 Syria  2014–2016 14.0 4 3 1 - 
42 SPCC 2014–2016 26.3 7 6 1 - 
43 CMF 2014–2015 6.0 12 12 - - 
44 PDP-3 2015–2020 86.3 6 - 6 - 
45 D&D 2016–2020 923.0 62 50 8 4 
46 SRGR-2 2016–2020 285.0 32 23 9 - 
47 FLOW-2 2016–2020 95.0 14 7 7 - 
        
 Other subsidy schemes not covered in database       
1 HR-SA* 2015–2016 4.5 15     
2 DGGF 2014–? n.a.     
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 Name Period Amount  # NGOs 
    Total NNGO INGO SNGO 
3 Mig.-2  2014 1.0     
4 HRF-2 2014–2017 16.0     
5 Mig.-3 2015–2016 n.a.     
6 Voice  2016–2020 50.0     
7 Account. 2016–2020 75.0     
8 LEAD  2016–2018 23.7     
9 ARC Fund 2016–2021 125.0     
10 MA&C 2016–2020 35.0     
        
 Decentralised funding via embassies        
1 Decentralised funding** 2010–2015 1,202.4 797 81 88 628 
 
* Information on (number of NGOs) and subsidy could not be included as this information is considered 
 confidential by the ministry in order to protect the concerned NGOs. 
** Data for decentralised funding is only available in detail for the period 2010–2015 and has been provided by 
 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of their internal administrative system. All NGOs have been cross-
 checked to translate the DAC categories of 21000 (international NGOs), 22000 (Donor-country-based NGOs) 
 and 23000 (Developing-country-based NGOs ) into the NNGO/INGO/SNGO categories used in this report.  
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Annex 2. Subsidy schemes per type of NGO 
 
Figure 2.1 Number of NGOs per subsidy scheme, per type of NGO (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN / Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
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Figure 2.2 Division of subsidies per schemes, per type of NGO (2003–2020) 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
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Annex 3. Changes in the ‘government dependency rate’ of Dutch NGOs – 2010 and  
 2014 
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Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of CBF database (www.cbf.nl)  
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Annex 4. Aid to and aid through NGOs 
 
The DAC distinguishes between aid to and aid through NGOs/CSOs or core support (where the donor 
supports a programme of the NGO) and earmarked funding (where the NGO receives donor funding to 
‘implement donor-initiated projects’). This is then a difference as well in terms of ownership and 
independence. Overall, aid through NGOs is substantially larger than aid to NGOs and is fast growing – 
also for the Netherlands (also see Huyse & De Bruyn 2015: 10). In fact, Dutch NGO funding has – 
according to DAC data – seen a remarkable shift in 2010. Table 4.1 shows that prior to 2010 the majority 
of CSO funding was reported as aid to NGOs. From 2010 onwards this turned upside down with the vast 
majority of funding falling under aid through NGOs. The abruptness of this switch is caused by a 
different interpretation of the DAC guidelines for reporting by the financial department of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mainly the fact that core funding of NGOs is essentially not possible under 
Dutch NGO funding rules). It only strengthens the remark of the DAC (OECD-DAC 2013: 32–33) ‘these 
statistics do not necessarily reflect the reality of some DAC members’ funding of CSOs (e.g. Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden) which is reported to the DAC as aid through CSOs’.  
 
Figure 4.1 Division of aid to and through NGOs based on DAC database (in % total) 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on DAC database 
 
It is, however, not only a change in reporting to the DAC. Aid through NGOs has also increased in reality. 
Even if we take a very liberal interpretation of this distinction between ‘core’ and ‘earmarked’ funding 
by grouping all major, individual and general thematic/minor schemes under the former and all 
remaining thematic/minor schemes under the latter, Table 4.1 clearly shows this change.  
 
Table 4.1 NGO funding divided over ‘aid to’ and ‘aid through’ (2003–2020), in € million and % total 
 annual subsidy 
 
 Aid to NGOs Aid through 
NGOs 
Total 
subsidy 
 Aid to NGOs Aid through 
NGOs 
Total 
subsidy 
2003 98.3% 1.7% 608.9 2013 74.0% 26.0% 634.0 
2004 98.7% 1.3% 642.3 2014 71.5% 28.5% 642.5 
2005 98.5% 1.5% 700.1 2015 72.2% 27.8% 614.6 
2006 95.4% 4.6% 773.0 2016 67.9% 32.1% 327.9 
2007 91.9% 8.1% 857.7 2017 69.9% 30.1% 294.7 
2008 91.9% 8.1% 846.3 2018 70.8% 29.2% 285.3 
2009 88.9% 11.1% 897.8 2019 71.1% 28.9% 284.1 
2010 90.2% 9.8% 884.7 2020 71.9% 28.1% 274.9 
2011 92.2% 7.8% 534.3     
2012 81.6% 18.4% 584.7 Total 86.0% 14.0% 10,687.7 
 
Source: NGO funding database CIDIN 
Note: Data for the period 2016–2020 is incomplete. 
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